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ABSTRACT
To The CORE: The Congress of Racial Equality
and the Shift to Black Militancy
Michael Jimenez

This thesis compares the history of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) to
that of its Seattle chapter. The study traces the entire history of CORE from 1942-1968
as well as the history of Seattle CORE from 1961-1968. The goal of this examination is
to identify why Seattle CORE successfully fended off the movement for black militancy
and consequently why national CORE failed to do so. Juxtaposing the two radically
different histories shows an integrated organization, bureaucratic leadership, a plan of
action based on nonviolent actions, and a strong attachment to the black community
were the central reasons for the success of Seattle CORE, and conversely, these areas
were why national CORE struggled. Moreover, this study shows the events and failures
over the first two decades created a susceptible environment for the organization to
abandon CORE's nonviolent ideology and the subsequent disintegration of the
Congress of Racial Equality as the walls of Jim Crow broke down.
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INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1961 a Greyhound bus was bombed and burned in Anniston,
Alabama while the police watched. Passengers were attacked, pulled from the bus and
beaten. They were Freedom Riders from the national Congress of Racial Equality.
James Farmer, the director, had America's attention when he called for a continuation
not a retreat. The image of the burning bus on television made a clear case for strategy
of sending bus after bus into Jackson, Mississippi until the jails became full and the
state would be forced to desegregate inter-state travel facilities. And that is what
happened. It was the law of the land. The Supreme Court had established it.
The Appeal produced Riders from across America. While friends began
organizing a Seattle chapter of CORE with the goal to raise funds for airfare to Los
Angeles, I volunteered to join the California group. Within two weeks of the Anniston
bombing I was on a bus bound for New Orleans. The CORE chapter in New Orleans
was conducting training classes in the practice of nonviolent civil disobedience.
Now in my mid sixties, I live in the South. The South has changed. America has
changed since 1961. It was not the Freedom Riders that produced that transformation.
The Freedom Ride's victory was the set up for the voter registration campaign. It was
that victory which changed America. If you can vote you are a citizen. The truly brave
people in the struggle were local folks who went to the voter registration offices and
then returned home and faced the consequences. There were young people from
Jackson, black and white, who walked into the segregated Greyhound station, joined
us, went to prison and when released returned home in Jackson. These Freedom
Riders were the courageous ones.
We arrived in Jackson in June. Police and their vans surrounded the terminal.
They watched passively as we walked into the whites only waiting room. Once inside
we sat on available benches together with arms locked. The police ordered us out. We
declined. Threatened with arrest we went limp and were dragged from the Greyhound
station by our feet and were loaded into paddy wagons (The Black Mariah, we later
called it). Arrested and booked for unlawful assembly, we entered the jails of Jackson
City and County. We were, of course, segregated by race and sex. Our fear was not of
police mistreatment, but of the uncertainty of being housed with criminal prisoners. At
no point during the summer did this occur. The standard length of incarceration was
forty-five days, first in Jackson and ultimately at Parchman Farm Mississippi State
Penitentiary. All summer long the buses kept arriving with more Freedom Riders. Our
plan to max out the jail facilities was working. What a relief!
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At the Parchman Farm, some distance North of Jackson, we first were housed in
maximum security cells, three men in a two man cell. We alternated by sleeping on the
floor...cement. The summer heat was intense, the food was poor and time stood still.
We sang but that quickly enraged the jailer. They threatened to put us out in the farm's
cotton fields as forced labor. We refused. It was not the work we feared but the danger
of isolation out in the fields with chance of bodily harm. As a group we decided to be
beaten together inside, rather than alone in the fields. We remained indoors, unbeaten,
until moved to a large communal housing where we met Freedom Riders from across
the nation for the first time.
The routine was dull. summer just crawls in the Mississippi heat. We made
chess men from Wonder bread, practiced yoga, took cooling showers (cold water). The
Broadway musical West Side Story was a hit in 1961. Some New Yorkers had seen it
and did a mangled yet entertaining re-creation. There was nothing to read. I slept a lot.
On Sundays a rabbi from Jackson visited us for service. Of course, we were all Jews.
The guards laughed and said they expected that we were. The rabbi did an interdenomination service interjecting relevant news concerning world and national events,
as well as related to our legal situation. This he did against regulations. Our lawyers
were able to communicate, somewhat, with us through the rabbi. The news that buses
were still arriving in Jackson encouraged us greatly.
Wonder bread, pork 'n beans, grits, and greens, corn bread and an egg now and
then with thin coffee made with chicory and most amazingly a scraping of blackened
fried grease... forty seven days in Hell's Kitchen.
- Ray Cooper, Seattle CORE's First Freedom Rider

Ray Cooper's story of resistance against segregation was one shared by
thousands of individuals during the 1960s. While each individual's details may differ,
their goal was the same; equal rights for all people, regardless of skin color. Cooper's
tone in this letter, written over four decades after the fact, displays the pacifist rhetoric of
the movement; however, it also carries an underlying theme shared among many
African American civil rights activists of the sixties that is not seen from the memoirs of
most white activists -- aggression. While white activists were motivated to help end
racial discrimination because it was the right thing to do, African Americans were angry.
2

They were tired of fear, discrimination, abuse, and prejudice that they endured for
centuries. They were fighting for basic rights that should be allotted to all human
beings. The right to a safe home. The right to sit at any open bus seat. The right to
have a good job. The right to eat at a lunch counter. The right to use a public restroom.
The right to a quality education. African Americans were fighting for a better way of life
for them and their children and their children's children and were willing to do whatever
it took to end the tyranny. African Americans would push the limits of nonviolence;
stepping across it when they felt it was necessary.
For the purposes of this work, there are three terms that need to elaborated
upon. First, pacifism is a commitment to peace and the opposition of war and violence.
Nonviolence is defined as a philosophy of abstention from violence. As the civil rights
movement advanced and frustration with the slow progress mounted, the displays of
civil disobedience increased in aggression, compromising a commitment to peace. At
this point, these acts ceased to be pacifist in nature, and are deemed strictly nonviolent.
Alternatively, militancy is defined as the state or condition of being combative or
disposed to fight.
Despite the nonviolent rhetoric, the Freedom Rides, like most of the civil rights
activism of the 1960s, were an aggressive act of resistance. In an article from The
Miami News, Freedom Rider Francis Randall, an assistant professor of history at
Columbia University, "admitted the nonviolent direct action of the Freedom Riders
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increases racial tension."1 The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) activists were not
only challenging the enforcement of laws, they were challenging the way of life that had
oppressed them for generations; and they were challenging it in the deepest part of the
Jim Crow South. National CORE devised the Freedom Rides to attract attention to the
organization. White activists were there because they believed the cause was just. The
African American activists were there to earn their equality, but more importantly, to
shove it in the face of their oppressors. They were fed up and not going to take it
anymore and you sense that same feeling when reading Cooper's letter. He was fed
up, and doing something about it, no matter what sacrifices he had to make.
Cooper, and his fellow activists launched the Freedom Rides and CORE into the
national spotlight. The bravery, resilience, and dedication of these individuals inspired
many more to join the cause, and motivated several to open CORE chapters across the
country to take up the fight against racial discrimination. One such chapter was located
in Seattle, Washington. When most think of the civil rights movement, the struggle in
the Pacific Northwest rarely comes to mind; the events are perceived to be only a
Southern issue. Even the historiography of the civil rights era has predominantly
focused upon the efforts in the Jim Crow South greatly ignoring the fight against
injustice in the North. As James Farmer, a founder and national director of CORE in the
early 1960s, conveyed in a letter to historian Gene Preuss in 1991:
―…one thing that desperately needs to be researched and written about is CORE
activities in the North in the 50‘s and 60‘s. Virtually all of the books done about the
movement have concentrated on the South, but simultaneous with the South were
1

"Another Tallahassee Test Due," The Miami News, June 18, 1961.
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activities in virtually every northern city under the aegis of CORE. This has not been
written about. It is an enormous field for historical research.‖2
The following study embodies Farmer‘s suggestion and assists in filling this void. The
civil rights movement was never constrained to the South, and neither was CORE‘s
efforts. While geographically Seattle lay outside the jurisdiction of the Jim Crow South,
for most of its history the city was segregated, as committed to white supremacy as any
location in America. People of color were excluded from jobs, neighborhoods and
schools, stores, restaurants, hotels, and other commercial establishments, even
hospitals.3 CORE prided itself on the organization‘s ability to achieve results using
peaceful techniques such as sit-ins, wade-ins, standing lines, and marches. The
pacifist nonviolent techniques proved very useful in integrating many establishments in
the North and the South; coupled with the highly publicized successes of the Freedom
Rides, participation in the organization of the March on Washington, and
demonstrations at the opening of the 1964 New York World‘s Fair helped CORE reach
its peak during the early 1960s. Despite the vast number of triumphs the history of the
organization is a tumultuous one.
During the mid-1960s the United States witnessed a change in the country‘s
culture. The movements for civil rights, Black Nationalism, women, peace, an end to
the Vietnam War, and the United Farm Workers were mixed with the Cold War tensions,
rioting, assassinations, and other cultural influences creating a melting pot of fear,

2

James Farmer to Gene Preuss, Feb. 18, 1991, Folder 3, Box 2j. James Farmer Papers, Center for
American History, University of Texas at Austin. Hereafter cited as Farmer Papers.
3
Segregated Seattle ed. James Gregory (Seattle: University of Washington, 2011)
http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/segregated.htm (accessed May 26, 2011).
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rebellion, and change pushed the country into a more radical and subversive society.
Within the civil rights movement, the rise of Black Nationalism reshaped history for
decades to come. Specifically in CORE, the Black Power Movement forced a division in
the organization. This division quickly tore the organization apart losing James Farmer
as its national director in 1966, along with the majority of CORE‘s funding. By 1968,
CORE had turned its back on the organization‘s white members and had evolved into a
full-fledged Black Nationalist organization. Replaced were the morals of Ghandi, the
desire for equality amid integration and pacifist philosophies at the heart of the
organization from its inception. Instead, CORE centered around the fundamental
concerns of the advancement of black interests, values, and culture as an isolated
identity. This shift in ideology cost the organization the leadership CORE was founded
upon, its financial support, the majority of CORE‘s membership; and eventually led to its
demise as a predominant civil rights organization.
While there is a significant amount of literature on the successes of the Congress
of Racial Equality, there is an even greater absence on this shift within the organization.
Previous historians have provided few explanations as to why CORE transformed from
a pacifist organization to a black militant group during the 1960s. The seminal
explanation hypothesized can be found within the canonical monograph by August
Meier and Elliot Rudwick from 1973, CORE: A Study in the Civil rights movement, 19421968. According to Meier and Rudwick, the organization‘s transformation came due to
the afflictions of broader ailments of the movement throughout the 1960s. Meier and
Rudwick write ―the swelling sense of pride stemming from the successes of black
6

protest of the early 1960s, disappointment with the Johnson Administration and the
white liberals, the fragmentation of the movement, the enormous difficulties in
overcoming the problems of the black masses, and the riots that erupted spontaneously
in 1964-1965, all prepared the way for the era of Black Power that emerged in 1966.‖4
Meier and Rudwick argue that the shift to Black Power was an effort to revitalize the
dying organization. As the defining work on CORE, this decline thesis has been almost
unchallenged for forty years.
During the past decade, the decline thesis has come under scrutiny. The first of
two hypotheses that directly confront the Meier and Rudwick thesis, rests inside the
2004 article ―The Two-ness of the Movement: James Farmer, Nonviolence, and Black
Nationalism‖ by Leilah Danielson. Danielson writes ―certainly CORE was in decline by
the late 1960s; its morale was low and membership had dropped dramatically. Yet this
interpretation implies that the rise of black nationalism largely was responsible for the
organization‘s decline and thus obscures the limitations of nonviolent direct action as a
strategy….‖5 The idea that the inherent weaknesses of nonviolence led to the decline in
CORE requires further study. If such an argument could be made, then why would this
not have affected more nonviolent organizations? Why were CORE and the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) the only two civil rights organizations to
shift to a radical Black Power doctrine; groups such as the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Southern Christian Leadership
4

August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil rights movement 1942-1968 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1973), 412.
5
Leilah Danielson, ―The Two-ness of the Movement: James Farmer, Nonviolence, and Black
Nationalism,‖ Peace and Change Vol. 29, No. 3&4 (July 2004), 431.
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Conference (SCLC) continued their fight for equality through nonviolence as the civil
rights movement turned its focus from education and suffrage to economics. Danielson
assumes nonviolent techniques are weaker than the militancy that CORE evolved to
utilize. From the responses of supporters of nonviolent techniques one can
demonstrate that nonviolence was a method utilized by the educated; a method that
stresses peace in the face of aggression. Retaliation is the real weakness, one that
Danielson overlooks. Fighting violence with violence only escalated matters in the
South. Furthermore, by 1964 the influence of Black Power already had afflicted the
organization negatively during the peak of CORE and the civil rights movement.
The most recent hypothesis on why the transformation from a pacifist nonviolent
approach evolved into black power ideology comes from a doctoral dissertation
―Cleveland CORE, Community Organization, and the Rise of Black Power‖ by Nashani
Frazier. Frazier argues that Black Power ideologies have always existed among the
members and the founders of CORE. Furthermore, the transformation of CORE was
inevitable due to the ―contradictory notions of its founders and in the incompatible
behavior of a few early black members.‖6 For example, Frazier points out that tensions
over the use of nonviolence did not only occur in the 1960s as Meier and Rudwick
argued; in fact, Frazier demonstrates through the history of Cleveland CORE that
nonviolent methods were challenged from the organizations existence. Frazier makes a
compelling argument; nevertheless, it is based upon his own misinterpretations. CORE

6

Nashani Frazier, ―Cleveland CORE, Community Organization, and the Rise of Black Power,‖ (Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University, 2008), 2.
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leadership always claimed Black Power ideology had its merit; however, the militancy,
violence, and separatism that accompanied these principles were not desired traits to
be associated with CORE under James Farmer and the other members who founded
the organization.
This investigation begins under the belief that all three hypotheses fail to provide
a complete answer as to why a civil rights organization, as successful as CORE, would
abandon its fundamental principles so soon after the civil rights movement and
President Lyndon B. Johnson had achieved two great triumphs with the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Less than a year after the passing of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, the organization shifted to Black separatism. ―When CORE‘s
official policy shifted to black separatism in 1966, several top staff members including
James Farmer, George Wiley, James McCain, and Carl Rachlin resigned,‖ along with
the vast majority of CORE‘s funding and membership.7 After these losses CORE went
through three additional national directors in the following two years.
Meier and Rudwick argue fragmentation that plagued the entire civil rights
movement led to the shift to militancy and the eventual death of CORE. This study
investigates the Seattle chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality in comparison to
national CORE to identify a division in philosophy. Seattle was chosen for many
reasons. First, the historiography on the northern civil rights movement is a growing
discourse, and the Pacific Northwest has rarely been touched upon. Secondly, it was a
7

Microfilming Corporation of America. The Papers of the Congress of Racial Equality, Addendum, 19441968: A Guide to the Microfilm Edition. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1986.
Hereafter cited as Guide to the CORE Papers Addendum.
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highly integrated chapter with one of the healthiest black to white ratios in CORE which
makes it ideal to study the influence of Black Power ideology. Furthermore, Seattle
CORE was one of the few chapters that remained intact after the 1966 change in
philosophy until the expulsion of all white members in 1968. And finally, the chapter like
most others, faced internal dissension explicitly due to the rising popularity of Black
Power in Seattle.
This investigation will demonstrate that CORE‘s structure assisted in creating the
division within the organization. Through this inspection, it will become clear that the
black nationalist movement CORE succumbed to in the late 1960s, was far from an
overall consensus among membership within the organization. The division that
plagued national CORE was persistent in Seattle; however, the Seattle chapter
managed to overcome these issues. Inspecting these events in comparison to the
events of national CORE's shift to militancy will shed light on why CORE succumbed to
black militancy.
Additionally, the chapter‘s relationship with national CORE highlights a major
weakness within the organization‘s foundational operating structure. The shift to
militancy within the organization came from an abandonment of CORE‘s philosophies
as national CORE lacked any real control over the individual chapters. Allowing each
individual chapter full autonomy created a situation that made the organization
susceptible to the shift from a nonviolent, integrationist policy to a separatist and militant
ideology, and weakened the leadership system.

10

This thesis has two agendas; first to compare the national organization with one
of the most accomplished chapters in the organization. By juxtaposing the struggles
and mistakes of national CORE against the accomplishments of Seattle CORE, it
becomes apparent why black militancy overtook a leading nonviolent organization.
Leadership troubles, disorder, inability to raise funds, and a separation between the
black community and national CORE debilitated the organization. In comparison,
Seattle CORE found ways to thrive in these areas despite facing the same difficulties as
national CORE. The second question this thesis sets out to explain is why an
organization as established as CORE, changes its strategy from nonviolence to
militancy after such monumental accomplishments in 1964 and 1965. The simple
answer is African Americans believed it was time for them to control their own fate and
lead the organization along with the civil rights movement for their own equal rights.
This was driven by a desire for more results. At the national level African Americans
were gaining the rights they deserved, but at the local level racial discrimination was still
rampant. Eliminating segregation did not assist every African American in finding a job;
and the ones who did, rarely found one outside menial labor. Having the right to vote
did not improve their living accommodations or remove the de facto segregation of their
local communities.
The first chapter establishes a brief history of national CORE dating from its
origins in 1942 through the final demise of the nonviolent strategy of CORE by 1968.
To understand what sets Seattle CORE apart from national CORE we first need to
investigate the chaotic history of the national organization. Chapter 1 highlights national
11

CORE's failures in building a working relationship with the black community, the
organization‘s inability to raise proper funding, the inefficiency of the organization and
inconsistent leadership that all played a major role in its demise.
Chapter 2 investigates the formation of Seattle CORE. Seattle CORE started
small with only a handful of dedicated members in 1961, and quickly rose to one of the
largest and most active chapters in all of the organization. The leaders of Seattle
CORE played a crucial role in the development of the affiliate and Chapter 2 examines
the impact of the founding members whose experience, dedication, and organization
were instrumental in creating a sound chapter. This chapter also looks at Seattle CORE
policies, rules and regulations as well as the early direct action and the influence Seattle
CORE developed within Seattle‘s black community. It demonstrates the strengths that
elevated Seattle CORE and highlights the weaknesses of the national organization that
led to its change in ideology and collapse.
Chapter 3 studies a turbulent era within the history of Seattle CORE. It begins
with Seattle CORE's expansion into new frontiers of racial inequality in the city in 1963.
As the chapter's membership increased to over 200 members, Seattle CORE began
activism against housing discrimination while continuing the fight against employment.
Their members invented a new nonviolent tactic called the "Shop-in" that gained
immediate results in the fight against local businesses' hiring practices. Despite this
success, Seattle CORE faced a small group of members who were exposed for
attempting to undermine leadership. In 1964, the chapter faced its own coup d‘état,
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concurrently with the passing and enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Led by six
members, including the assistant secretary, the dissenting group was called ―The
Faction.‖ In an invitation to a special meeting on August 24, 1964 these six among
others were called by the officers of Seattle CORE to ―discuss in the open, divisive and
derogatory allegations and activities within the chapter by certain members.‖8 The
heated meeting ended with the majority of the faction leaving CORE and forming their
own organization, while the remaining members agreed to adhere to CORE principles.9
With the dissension behind them, Seattle CORE launched a massive project called the
Drive for Equal Employment in Downtown Seattle (DEEDS). DEEDS set a lofty goal
that the chapter failed to realize fully. This era witnessed many highs and lows for
Seattle CORE; membership hit an all time high, they expanded the focus to include
housing discrimination, the Shop-in yielded significant and immediate results. However,
internal turmoil overwhelmed the chapter and a massive failure with their largest project
exposed the organization's inability to achieve the results they desired. Yet Seattle
CORE continued to persevere while national CORE yielded under similar
circumstances.
The concluding chapter looks at the final years of Seattle CORE. From their
continued assault on employment discrimination, the chapter's entrance into education
discrimination, and the loss of many of the founding members of Seattle CORE. More
importantly, Chapter 4 looks at the forced shift to militancy in Seattle CORE;
8

Special Meeting Notice, August 20 1964, Addendum to CORE Papers.
Joan Singler, Jean Durning, Bettylou Valentine, and Maid Adams, Seattle in Black and White: The
Congress of Racial Equality and the Fight for Equal Opportunity (Seattle and London: University of
Washington Press, 2011), 181.
9
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demonstrating the fragmentation of the organization. Despite declaring itself a Black
Militant organization in 1966, Seattle CORE continued working as an integrated chapter
through 1967. It was not until national CORE expelled all white members that the final
step of the transformation to Black Nationalism occurred. Seattle CORE tried to rebuild
the chapter, but could not rally enough supporters; facing drops in membership and
funding, the chapter ceased activity just a few months after the expulsion of white
members. The narrative concludes with the reactions from white Seattle CORE
members, further displaying the division that grew between the foot soldiers of the civil
rights movement, the individual chapters within the organization, and the leaders of
national CORE.
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CHAPTER I: HISTORY OF THE CONGRESS OF RACIAL EQUALITY

This chapter outlines the history of national CORE from its founding in 1942
through the final shift to a Black Nationalist organization in 1968. Along the way, the
failures of the national organization become apparent. The ineptitude amongst
leadership in the National Action Committee (NAC) and its elected national directors,
the lack of organization between national CORE and the local affiliates, the inability to
raise proper funding throughout the organization, and a failure to create a relationship
with the black community led to radical change in the organization's ideology.
CORE‘s roots can be traced to another pacifist group, the Fellowship of
Reconciliation (FOR), an English organization created in 1914.10 In 1915, FOR was
founded in the United States to oppose the country's entry into World War I.11 FOR
promoted pacifist nonviolent philosophies as the organization‘s methods of challenging
conflict. Early in 1942, James Farmer wrote a memo to Abraham Johannes Muste, the
executive director of FOR, outlining ideas for nonviolent direct action against racial
inequality called a ―Brotherhood Mobilization," that would create an autonomous
nationwide nonviolent organization.12 At the subsequent FOR national Council Meeting

10

Joe E. Leonard Jr., ―‘We are Catching Hell Down Here‘: The Struggle For Public Accommodations and
Voter Franchisement by the Congress of Racial Equality in Louisiana, 1960-1965‖ (Ph.D. dissertation,
Howard University, 2004), 2.
11
"Fellowship of Reconciliation - For a World of Peace, Justice and Nonviolence," http://www.forusa.org
<last accessed March 1, 2012>.
12
Meier and Rudwick, 7.
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in Ohio, James Farmer was authorized to organize this pilot project in Chicago based
on his ideas from the memo to Muste.13
The founders did not want this project to be just ―another talking group,‖ so they
set out to create a direct action plan that would attract members who would lay the
foundation for a larger organization.14 In March of 1942, they chose the White City
Roller Rink as their first nonviolent direct action target.15 They chose this location
because the roller rink was well known for excluding African Americans a violation of the
Illinois' state civil rights law.16 White City circumvented the law by claiming it was a
private club; however, a twenty-four member interracial group, including Farmer, proved
this was not the case one night in April 1942. When the group attempted to gain
admission, the white members were allowed inside, and the blacks were denied
access.17 This set in motion a series of negotiations with White City; more importantly,
it energized the small group of activists. The goal to attract members by directly

13

James Farmer to Gene Preuss, Feb. 18, 1991, Farmer Papers.
Meier and Rudwick, 7.
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The White City Amusement Park, that originally housed the White City Roller Rink, opened in 1905
however the park was condemned in 1939 and only the Roller Rink remained open. The Amusement
Park shares its namesake with the 1893 Columbian Exposition; the expo earned the nickname the "White
City" because the builders used white plaster for many of the buildings. It is possible the White City
Amusement Park was named after the Expo as they were in the same area of Chicago and the locations
were separated by less than 4 miles. It is also a possibility the owners were inspired by the Expo to create
the park. According Jean Bond's December 6, 1959 article "White City Dies as She Lived," Chicago
Tribune, the owner, Aaron Jones, had visited the Expo and aspired to create a park similar to it.
However, articles from the Chicago Tribune in 1906 and 1907 list Morris and Joseph Beifeld, two brothers
from Chicago as the owners. Furthermore, the 1910 U.S. Census also lists Morris Beifeld as the owner.
In either case, the only possible relation between the 1893 Expo and the park may be inspiration.
16
Meier and Rudwick, 7.
17
George Houser, CORE: A Brief History, 4. CORE Papers.
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confronting discrimination worked. From the initial twenty-four activists the organization
swelled to more than fifty people by the following meeting.18
This pilot project evolved into the Committees of Racial Equality later in 1942.
The Congress of Racial Equality, the name adopted in 1943, pioneered the technique of
nonviolence to combat racial injustice within the United States utilizing the same
Satyagraha (nonviolent direct action) philosophies as FOR.19 An interracial group of
Chicago students who founded the Committee of Racial Equality included James
Farmer, Bernice Fisher, Joe Guinn, James R. Robinson, George Houser, and Homer
Jack. CORE‘s goal was simple; to directly confront discrimination with nonviolence, not
only in the South but also in the overlooked North and Midwest.

1940s

The existence of African American soldiers fighting overseas against oppression
in World War II revealed the contradictory social practices within the United States
during the 1940s. As Eleanor Roosevelt stated "the nation cannot expect the colored
people to feel that the U.S. is worth defending if they continue to be treated as they are
treated now." Despite the presence of Jim Crow segregation and quieter discrimination
outside the South, African Americans saw the second World War as an opportunity to
rise out of poverty and take positive steps towards equality. In the presence of threats

18
19

Ibid, 5.
This is CORE leaflet (New York, NY: Congress of Racial Equality, 1959), 2 CORE Papers.
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to march on Washington, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order
#8802 which opened defense jobs to African Americans on the basis of equal pay for
equal work. Once WWII ended, African Americans targeted the segregation and
discrimination they suffered at home.20 The events of WWII propelled the civil rights
movement to the forefront in America as well as organizations such as CORE.21
The first years following the creation of CORE, the organization attempted to
catch up to its rising popularity. As chapters popped up across the country, the
founders worked to establish an overarching national CORE. Cities such as St. Louis,
Cleveland, Detroit, Denver, Kansas City, Philadelphia, Minneapolis, Cincinnati and
Syracuse were among the first to establish chapters.22 The speed at which CORE
spread created institutional problems that plagued the organization throughout its
history. The most crippling issues would be a general lack of organization, the inability
of local chapters to maintain activity, national CORE‘s inability to control individual
chapters, and funding.
Very early in the organization‘s history it became apparent to CORE national
secretary George Houser that a disconnection between the chapters and national
CORE hampered the organization. He wrote:
There is practically no contact between the groups except as an occasional
bulletin is sent [to chapter officers] from the volunteer national secretary . . . .
20
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Practically no financial support comes to the national office from the local groups.
Last year this amounted to $113.00 . . . . There is no contact between national
office and the rank and file members of the affiliated groups . . . . Members of
CORE in various cities know practically nothing about what is happening
nationally. it is impossible to support an organization on the basis of this national
scheme.23
Houser's undated memo from the mid 1940s illustrates major issues in the organization.
First, communication was almost non-existent between the local chapters and national
CORE giving local leaders free rein to lead each chapter the way the saw fit and, in
many cases, not as national CORE expected. Without communication to each chapter
and each individual member, it was impossible for CORE to establish uniformity in
ideology, policy, and training. Second, inadequate funding plagued the organization.
The lack of proper funding limited national CORE's ability to initiate direct action
campaigns, prohibited the hiring of full time employees, and derailed plans to create a
national office. The national organization's failure to establish mechanisms to provide
financial stability through individual chapter membership dues crippled the organization
in its infancy. The lack of local financial support became a source for turmoil between
national CORE and the local chapters in many of the future national conventions.
These points highlight a more important issue. Each chapter governed itself with no
direction from national CORE; this early autonomy made it impossible for national
CORE to exert any control over the individual chapters when it later tried to establish a
chain of command. Once the local chapters were used to these liberties, they would not
surrender them willingly. An undated memo sent out by George Houser argued the
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structure of CORE was unsustainable from the beginning. Houser realized these issues
would make it impossible for the organization to survive without significant changes.24
Furthermore, the local chapters were highly unstable. As Meier and Rudwick
argued ―even the busiest and most successful chapters typically exhibited a pattern of
intensive activity followed by decline ending either in a revival or dissolution.‖25 For
instance, CORE‘s first established chapter in Chicago is a prime example of the
struggle individual chapters faced. Less than two years after its founding, Chicago
CORE became inactive as financial support and membership declined. In the fall of
1945, local NAACP leader, Gerald Bullock revived Chicago CORE; still, he had difficulty
recruiting members.26 As Chicago CORE was the original CORE chapter, Chicago
operated under the principles by the same individuals who united as the leading
governing body of national CORE, the National Action Committee.
The recruitment rules required each individual to be well versed in nonviolent
methods, to accept the "Action Discipline" based on the teachings of Ghandi, and to be
highly active in CORE's work. As Meier and Rudwick point out, "commitment and
dedication were deemed more important than size, and prospective members were
carefully investigated and interviewed before being admitted."27 CORE founders also
established an anti-leftist policy in an effort to deter Communist issues that undermined
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many other reform organizations of the 1930s.28 Furthermore, each chapter was to be
integrated with a healthy ratio of white to black members. When these requirements
hampered Chicago CORE's ability to attract new membership Bullock dropped the strict
recruiting guidelines and opened membership to allow Chicago‘s local Trotskyist
Socialist Workers Party (SWP). Houser concerned that the SWP would not follow
nonviolent protocols warned Bullock to no avail. By the following summer of 1946,
Houser‘s fears became reality. Chicago CORE-News, the chapter‘s monthly newsletter,
openly advocated retaliatory violence and the chapter‘s meetings faced internal
disputes regarding the use of violent and nonviolent techniques at demonstrations. In
1947, students from the University of Chicago withdrew from the SWP led version of
Chicago CORE and formed their own chapter of CORE adhering to the organization's
nonviolent founding principles; the SWP version of Chicago CORE dissipated soon
thereafter.29 Houser‘s inability to intervene in the decision of the Chicago CORE
illustrates a problem that the organization‘s leadership faced throughout its existence:
national CORE had no control over individual chapters.
Generating membership was a common problem, but even more pressing was
the lack of financial support. In 1945, national CORE‘s finances could only maintain
expenses totaling a paltry $100 a month.30 The organization could not afford to hire a
full-time salaried staff and repeated attempts to gain financial support from local
chapters were rejected. In 1946, at the national CORE convention a proposal to split
28
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dues equally was tabled. Later that year, when the elected Executive Committee of
CORE created a project to raise $7,000 in funds to open and staff a national office,
every chapter, except Cleveland CORE, rejected the plan.31
In spite of funding and organizational problems, national CORE moved forward
with an ambitious plan: The Journey of Reconciliation, a joint venture between CORE
and FOR, that would test fulfillment of the recent Supreme Court decision, in Morgan v.
Virginia (1946), against segregation in public transportation and interstate travel. The
Journey would be the precursor to CORE‘s better known Freedom Rides of 1961. In
preparation for the Journey, the participants, an integrated group of eight whites and
eight blacks, underwent rigorous training in nonviolent techniques and philosophy. In
CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, Meier and Rudwick write that ―for hours
on end they engaged in sociodramas, acting out the appropriate responses to be taken
in the face of abuse behavior….‖32 It was a requirement of national CORE that every
member undergo extensive training prior to any activism. However, lack of funding and
a general disregard from some of CORE‘s local chapters made training every CORE
member impossible. National CORE did provide summer interracial workshops
beginning in 1947 to train leaders of local CORE chapters; however, inability to raise
funds shut down the summer workshops in 1954. Thus, nonviolent philosophy and
methods training was inconsistent throughout the organization.
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The Journey organizers planned a two-week bus trip that originated in
Washington D.C. and took the group through Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee and
Kentucky. During the trek that began on April 9, 1947, the group incurred twelve arrests
as they challenged Jim Crow seating arrangements.33 Just outside Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, the group had their most significant incident. Two of the activists, Andrew
Johnson, a law student, and Joe Felmet, a representative from the Workers Defense
League were arrested for sitting together. After their arrests, and posting of bail, the
group was chased by ―two full taxicabs filled with angry whites armed with sticks and
rocks,‖ who threatened to burn down the minister‘s house where the group previously
arranged to stay the night.34 The group fled to avoid escalation of the event. The
charges against Johnson and Felmet would later be dropped. The rest of the trip was
relatively quiet, with a couple more arrests but nothing eventful. The report from Houser
and Bayard Rustin, the FOR Youth secretary, stated ―most white passengers were
apathetic,‖ the responding police were usually ―polite and calm,‖ and the black
passengers were ―fearful‖ but would ―move from the rear forward‖ to the front of the bus
once they realized the others were not bothered. Houser and Rustin credited the
nonviolent, disciplined behavior they learned just before undertaking the Journey. 35
More importantly, the experience confirmed the conviction of the early CORE members
in the philosophies of nonviolence.
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On the heels of the Journey of Reconciliation, CORE‘s fifth national convention
took place. For the first time, all chapters were represented. The national office ran
primarily on donations and national CORE hoped to use the Journey‘s success to
approve expansion and funding from the local chapters. To their dismay, the delegates
from local chapters continued to refuse arguing that funding national CORE would
undermine the autonomy of the local chapters. In a compromise, they agreed to a one
cent tax per member that would go to national CORE. For the remainder of the decade,
national CORE attempted to convince the local chapters to increase funding to help
establish a full staffed national office to no avail. In 1949-1950 the national office
received $1528 in donations compared to only $437 from chapter payments, a disparity
that hampered the organization‘s development.36

1950s

The first half of the 1950s witnessed a decline in CORE activity. The Los
Angeles chapter shut down after the departure of their leader, Berkeley‘s chapter
imploded after a large employment campaign failed to yield any positive results from
Oakland's Sears and Roebuck and Chicago, New York, Omaha, and St. Louis all
witnessed severe declines in membership and activity. Denver and Minneapolis were
too unstable to get campaigns started. In Cleveland, growing sentiment that CORE was
insignificant in comparison to fellow civil rights groups after multiple demonstrations
36
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failed to yield results caused a severe decline in membership; national CORE would
declare the chapter defunct in 1953. As seen in Berkeley, Cleveland and Chicago,
disappointment following failed campaigns usually meant the death of a chapter. In
contrast to the 1940s that saw more local chapters created than disintegrate, the early
1950s witnessed only one successful chapter, Baltimore, open while nearly half of
CORE‘s local chapters shut down. ―At the 1952 Convention, Houser admitted ‗CORE is
stronger as a principle than as an organization;‘‖ and at the 1954 convention he claimed
CORE was weaker than ever before.37 Despite the monumental achievement in the
Supreme Court ruling of Brown vs. Board on May 17, 1954, only seven local affiliates
remained, and many were on the brink of collapse. CORE did not see the same
reenergizing that other civil rights organizations did from the Brown vs. Board ruling due
to CORE's inability to build a relationship with the black community. The majority of local
chapters rosters were predominantly white and many blacks viewed CORE as a
primarily white Northern organization.38 With this perception working against CORE,
African Americans who supported civil rights, chose to participate in organizations they
believed would benefit African Americans; mainly the NAACP.
Even more troubling than the breakdown of the organization was the failure to
recruit African American members to the affiliates and to promote black leadership
within national CORE. In the 1950‘s the top officials were overwhelmingly white. Meier
and Rudwick point out that ―James Farmer served as national chairman in 1950-1951
37
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but his successors were all whites, and nearly all elected national officers were also
white.‖39 National CORE leaders knew that without deep roots in the black community
CORE lacked the influence necessary to make significant gains in their action projects.
Consequently, an effort to increase black membership and leadership was made a
priority for the organization in the early 1950s.
By 1955 the organization was on life support despite a major achievement in the
civil rights movement with the Brown vs. Board decision on May 17, 1954. In the words
of Billie Ames, who became a liaison between chapters, if CORE was going to survive
―something has got to be done – and quick.‖40 In December of 1955, Martin Luther King
Jr. led the Montgomery bus boycott and drew daily national headlines. National CORE
leaders quickly realized their opportunity to reinvigorate CORE rested within the South;
not only did the region provide potential for direct action protests, but CORE could
attract national attention to revive membership and expand the organization's influence.
With the improbability of attracting white involvement in the South, CORE lifted the
requirement that all CORE chapters had to have both white and black members from
the CORE constitution.41 This decision had a profound impact upon the organization
creating an even greater imbalance of races in the majority of chapters.
The last few years of the 1950s witnessed a rise in the popularity of the civil
rights movement. As King motivated blacks to fight for their rights, whites also
responded to the call against oppression. While all white civil right activists believed it
39
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was the right thing to do, many were also motivated by other factors. Some white
Americans looked for a means to rebel against the infringement upon their civil liberties
in the 1950s that was aided by McCarthyism; the civil rights movement provided the
perfect outlet. With Americans united under a cause, CORE witnessed a resurgence in
membership and funding; and a change in leadership stabilized the organization.
By 1958, under the leadership of Finance secretary, James Robinson, the
organization‘s funds more than doubled despite continued refusal of local chapters to
supply any assistance to national CORE.42 Robinson‘s work generated enough funds to
expand the national staff. As Robinson excelled at fundraising for the organization,
Marvin Rich, the newly appointed Community Relations Director, made CORE a
household name. For example, Rich used funds to create This is CORE and CORE
Rules for Action, two brochures that enlightened communities about the work CORE
was doing locally and nationally. Through the work of Robinson and Rich, CORE
expanded from 4500 to more than 9000 contributors in 1959, and 12,000 in 1960.43 In
addition, CORE opened new affiliates in Nashville, Tennessee, Rock Hill and Sumter,
South Carolina, Portland, Oregon, Miami and Tallahassee, Florida, and Charlestown,
West Virginia, while reopening chapters in Columbia, South Carolina, Kansas City,
Missouri, and San Francisco and Los Angeles, California.44 For the first time in a
decade CORE appeared to be growing rather than dying. At the same time, the
technique of nonviolence became the dominant strategy of the movement for racial
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equality. As the 1950s drew to an end, the organization was poised to become a major
player in the civil rights movement.45

1960s
In 1960 CORE pioneered a new tactic in the fight for equality, the ―jail-in.‖ On the
13th of February in 1960, Patricia Stephens Due along with eight other Florida A&M
University students conducted their first sit-in at Woolworth‘s lunch counter. As Due put
it in an interview in November 2002, ―we sat there quietly… hecklers surrounded us,
threatening us with bodily harm - one had a gun - but we continued to sit.‖46 They sat for
two hours after being refused service. The following Saturday, February 20th, Due
along with ten additional Congress of Racial Equality members returned to the
segregated Woolworth‘s lunch counter. Once again they sat there quietly and
peacefully while being heckled and threatened by the white patrons. However, this time
history was made, as the eleven civil rights activists were arrested. Due explained their
"crime": ―we sat at a Woolworth lunch counter and tried to order food.‖47 The initial
charges included disturbing the peace and inciting a riot. The eleven individuals
included two high school students, eight Florida A&M University students and one
African American woman, Mrs. Mary Ola Gaines, who worked as a domestic in the
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community.48 By their trial date, six additional charges had been levied against them.
Unable to hire local attorneys, lawyers traveled over 500 miles to represent the
accused. Patricia Due stated ―the courtroom was a circus… we were treated with utter
disrespect. The word "nigger" was used frequently to describe us in the courtroom. We
were in a segregated courtroom waiting for justice when none was forthcoming.‖49 Six
of the eight charges were dropped; nevertheless, they were found guilty on two charges
which she says "we never knew what [the charges] were." 50 Due and her coconspirators were suspended from FAMU and faced the choice of paying a $300 fine or
jail time. Eight of the eleven chose the latter, initiating the first ever jail-in of the civil
rights movement.51 Five of the eight including Due spent 49 days in jail as a protest
against segregation in the United States. Similar actions were simultaneously taking
place in Greensboro, North Carolina and St. Louis, Missouri. This new direct action
tactic launched CORE to the forefront of the civil rights movement. In newspapers
across the country, the jail-ins received mixed reactions.52 The Gadsden Times argued
CORE was causing trouble with their "sit-ins, jail-ins, and sleep-ins; the paper also
depicted the "Negroes battle plan" in a negative light and questioned the "real objectives
of the Negroes' fight for civil rights."53 "The jail-ins demonstrated a shift of leadership to
younger, more militant Negroes" argued the New York Times author Claude Sittons. In
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The Compass, a North Carolina based newspaper, argued "1960 shall be remembered
by all, especially Negroes. This was the year of numerous accomplishments toward
freedom...." The author later goes on to say "these sit-ins are very well organized" and
the "massive sit-ins are at the top of the Negroes collective gains on freedom."54
The organization continued the rapid growth it witnessed at the end of the
previous decade. By July of 1960 CORE had jumped to twenty-four chapters, an
estimated 1000 active members, and there were an additional eleven chapters pending
approval to become affiliates as well. CORE‘s funds also expanded at this time. From
June to December national CORE received $144,000 in contributions in private
donations alone. Still the local chapters supplied less than 1% of that amount. 55 The
swift growth also had negative ramifications. In an attempt to support the student
activists of the South, CORE sent out their newly hired field secretaries without the
proper training in nonviolent philosophy and techniques. Furthermore, the organization‘s
structure came under attack by local chapters. Many decisions were made by national
CORE without contacting the local chapters. The organization underwent a massive
restructuring; James Robinson, who at the time was the most influential member of
CORE, begrudgingly stepped down from his position as finance secretary, but stayed
on as membership director, and James Farmer was elected to the new position of
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national director as of February 1, 1961 by the National Action Committee created to
direct national CORE.56
With Farmer now leading the way, CORE looked for a major campaign that
would thrust the organization into the spotlight. The Boynton vs. Virginia decision which
declared segregation in interstate bus and railways travel unconstitutional provided a
perfect opportunity for CORE. Taking a page from their highly successful Journey of
Reconciliation in 1947, the organization decided to test segregation laws on buses.
This time CORE targeted the terminal facilities in deep South cities, which the
organization had been too fearful to confront during the earlier Journey. In a press
release, CORE warned that potential Freedom Rider ―must be willing to accept threats,
violence and jail sentences.57 SNCC,NAACP, SCLC and CORE members from across
the country raised the funds necessary to travel South and partake in what would be
one of the defining moments of the civil rights movement. CORE organized training in
Washington D.C. to assure that each Freedom Rider received the same extensive
training that the Journey of Conciliation activists had undergone.
The first CORE Freedom Rides started on May 4, 1961 from Washington D.C.
There were 13 activists, split into two interracial groups to test both Greyhound and
Trailways bus companies. The two buses traveled through Virginia without incidence.58
The Freedom Riders successfully challenged the prohibitions against their use of white
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designated lunch counters and waiting rooms. Through North Carolina there was only
one minor incident when a Rider was arrested for sitting in a shoe shine chair; he was
acquitted on the charges two days later. Violence erupted for the first time at the Rock
Hill Greyhound station on May 9, when a mob at the entrance of the white waiting room
beat John Lewis and Albert Bigelow. The following day James Peck and Henry Thomas
were arrested after sitting down to eat at a white lunch counter in Winnsboro, South
Carolina; only to be released 7 hours later with no charges.59 The Riders made their
way through Atlanta, Georgia without incident.
In spite of warnings from SCLC leader Fred Shuttlesworth that a mob planned on
stopping the buses, the Freedom Riders set forth for Birmingham, Alabama on May 14,
1961.60 As the Greyhound bus arrived at the Anniston terminal, a group of about fifty
surrounded the bus. The mob attacked the bus, denting the sides, slashing tires, and
shattering the windows.61 After about twenty minutes, the Anniston police showed up
and escorted the battered bus out of the station. At the city limits the police car turned
back and the bus was once again vulnerable to the mob.62 As the Riders stayed in their
seats, the bus came under attack again with Alabama Klansmen demanding the
Freedom Riders come out and get the beating that was coming to them. As the mob
grew impatient, Cecil "Goober" Lewallyn returned to his car. Moments later he
"suddenly ran toward the bus and tossed a flaming bundle of rags through a broken
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window. Within seconds the bundle exploded, sending dark gray smoke throughout the
bus."63 The Klansmen tried to keep the Riders locked inside to burn in the bus, but fuel
tank explosions drove the mob back. As the Riders escaped, highway patrolmen
dispersed the angry mob.64 The Greyhound Riders were taken by the carload to the
Anniston Memorial Hospital.
The second group of Freedom Riders, arrived at the Anniston terminal
approximately an hour after the first bus. Klansmen assaulted Peck, Thomas, and two
other Freedom Riders, Charles Person and Walter Bergman. After the Klansmen beat
the Riders to the brink of death, they dragged the four men to the back of the bus and
restored Jim Crow segregated seating.65 The Klansmen joined the Riders aboard the
bus for the next leg of the trip; they threatened, taunted, and abused the Riders all the
way to Birmingham. What the Riders did not know was the Klansmen were there to
keep the bus moving to Birmingham, where another, much larger mob waited for them.
The Klansmen had a deal to have a 15 minute time window to assault the Riders before
the police would show up.66
As the Trailways bus came up to Birmingham the Freedom Riders "cleaned
themselves up as if they were going to a party or something. Except we knew it wasn‘t
going to be any party or picnic‖ recalled Peck.67 Once the bus pulled into the depot,
Peck first saw a group of white men: he described the group as around 25, ―all young,
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and grinning at each other;‖ hidden out of view were four or five dozen others.68
Despite being bloodied and beaten, Peck along with Person entered the Birmingham
station and headed for the lunch counter. Groups of men attacked the two. The assault
was caught on film and would be shown a few days later in the program Who Speaks
for Birmingham? a CBS special on race relations in the city.69 Peck and Persons were
badly injured in their assault, with Peck requiring 50 stitches after he was knocked
unconscious.70 After the allotted window elapsed, the Birmingham police arrived, but
the attackers had already left.
The Riders questioned if they should go on after their experiences at
Birmingham, yet they decided it was their only choice; however, no bus drivers would
transport them and CORE was forced to suspend the Freedom Rides. In lieu of bomb
threats and angry mobs planning to assault the airport transporting the Freedom Riders,
all plane traffic was suspended. The Freedom Riders were stuck in Alabama until the
Justice Department made secret arrangements to transport the group to New Orleans
for evacuation.71
Attorney General Robert Kennedy pled for a "cooling off period."72 Despite the
request from the Attorney General, another group formed by students in Nashville led
by Lewis. Ignoring the larger issue of constitutional rights, Alabama authorities restored
'law and order' by branding the Tennessee students as troublemakers and criminals;"
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Alabama police placed the Nashville Riders in "protective custody." Two days later, four
were "released" at 4 A.M. at the Alabama and Tennessee border with orders to return to
Nashville.73 The Nashville Riders were determined to make it to New Orleans and made
arrangements to return to Birmingham later that day by car. After traveling back roads,
the group made it to Birmingham unscathed, and were met by reinforcements raising
the total to 21 Freedom Riders.74 The plan was to board a 10:00 A.M. bus to New
Orleans on Friday May 19, 1961; however, Greyhound drivers refused to take the
Freedom Riders who were forced to stay overnight at the terminal.75 It took the
intervention of President Kennedy to find a driver willing to take the Riders to New
Orleans, but on May 20th, the Freedom Rides were finally back on track.
At the next terminal in Montgomery Alabama, a mob of 200 were hidden and
awaited the bus arrival.76 The Freedom Riders arrived with only one lone police officer
escort. The mob quickly ascended on the Riders, severely beating and injuring most of
the Riders. A personal representative of the president, John Seigenthaler, had been
dispatched to Alabama as a federal peacekeeping force to maintain order. As he
arrived a few minutes after the bus did, he witnessed the mob assaulting the Riders. In
an attempt to help two of the female passengers, he was attacked by the mob; he
suffered a fractured skull and several broken ribs.77 Once news spread to the White
House, the Attorney General was forced to act. The Kennedy administration ordered
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600 U.S. Marshals into Alabama to the dismay of Alabama Governor John Patterson.78
The pressure applied by the Freedom Riders created a rift between Patterson and the
Kennedy administration. By challenging local and state segregation statues the
Freedom Riders forced the Kennedy administration to choose a side on the struggle for
civil rights.79 On one side was Patterson upholding his state sovereignty, and on the
other, was the federal government intervening to protect the constitutional rights of U.S.
citizens. Moreover, at the request of Robert Kennedy, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, outlawed segregation in interstate travel that took effect on November 1,
1961.
Farmer and the National Action Committee felt CORE was being upstaged by
Martin Luther King and others in the civil rights movement.80 "Much of Farmer's
competitive drive was, of course, directed at King. Still smarting from the SCLC leader's
usurpation of the nonviolent movement during the bus boycott" CORE dispatched
Farmer and a group of New Orleans CORE members to Montgomery "to share the
spotlight."81 "Lewis, recalled years later, that Farmer began and ended with self-serving
pronouncements on CORE's centrality:
It was clear to everyone that he wanted to take the ride back now, when we all
knew that without our having picked it up, there would have been no more
Freedom Ride. It didn't matter to me at all who got the credit; that wasn't the
point. But from where Farmer stood, that seemed to be all that mattered. He
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saw this ride in terms of himself. He kept calling it 'CORE's ride,' which amazed
everyone.82
It was true that Farmer's inclination was to reassert CORE to the forefront of the
Freedom Rides. Farmer admitted in his autobiography that "although I welcomed the
intervention of SNCC, a concern burned with me. I could not let CORE's new program
slip from its grasp and be taken over by others."83 Many saw garnering national
attention as the root of CORE's return to the Freedom Rides, not the cause itself.
On Sunday May 21, 1961, Farmer joined King, the freedom riders, other civil
rights leaders and 1500 supporters at the First Baptist Church in Montgomery with the
protection of the marshals. However, the marshals were unprepared and undermanned
to handle the increasingly hostile mob. Around 10:00 PM, Patterson ordered martial law
in the city of Montgomery and dispatched the National Guard.84 The National Guard
surrounded the church and placed everyone inside under protective custody. Everyone
inside was under the control of Patterson and the National Guard but without the
intervention, it was very likely the mob would have seized control. It was not until 4:00
AM was the congregation finally evacuated.85
On Wednesday, May 23, 1961, after two days of rest and debate about the future
of the Freedom Rides, a group of twelve decided to continue to their next stop in
Jackson, Mississippi choosing to test Trailways buses. This time, they were heavily
defended by the Alabama National Guard. The bus experienced only minor incidents
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on the way to the border; however, upon reaching it, rumors of a dynamite attack
delayed the bus over an hour while National Guardsman investigated the area.86 At the
same time a second group of fifteen Freedom Riders, including Farmer who reluctantly
joined, reached Montgomery to test Greyhound's compliance to the laws as well.87 No
one, outside the activists, anticipated more Freedom Riders. Shortly after a third group
of Riders departed from Atlanta.88
As the Trailways Riders safely reached Jackson, they filed into the white waiting
room. As police captain J. L. Ray ordered them to move on, the Riders ignored his
demand. All twelve Riders were arrested and charged with inciting a riot, breach of the
peace, and failure to obey a police officer.89 The second group of Riders, that included
Farmer, followed a similar pattern that resulted in the arrest of all fifteen Riders. Both
groups refused bail with the intention of remaining in jail until Mississippi authorities
agreed to recognize the legality of desegregated interstate transit."90
The Freedom Rides had grown from a small display of activism to a national
movement. Over 360 arrests related to the Freedom Rides were made that summer.91
The Freedom Rides significantly influenced the development of CORE. For the first
time the mass media saw CORE as a major civil rights organization.92 Membership
rosters exploded, funding rose sharply and chapters popped up all across the country.
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In 1962, CORE reached its peak of 53 chapters. A substantial number of African
Americans joined CORE; especially in cities with all black chapters.
Nevertheless, the Freedom Rides were a colossal financial burden on CORE. By
the end of July 1961 CORE had spent over $138,000 on the Rides in bail and legal
fees. In an effort to bankrupt CORE, Mississippi authorities ordered all "196 persons
released thus far to be arraigned within 10 days."93 In addition, fearing punishment
local bonding firms refused to supply bonds to Freedom Riders; facing another
$372,000 in bail that the organization could not afford, CORE borrowed heavily.94
National CORE went from raising $240,000 in the fiscal year of 1960-61 to
accumulating $607,000 in 1961-62, CORE's largest income for any year.95 In 1962-63
CORE raised an additional $520,000. However, their debt also increased. In February
of 1962, Farmer sent out a letter announcing "our financial cupboard is bare; today
there is only $2081 in the bank. Unpaid bills total $25,540."96 In the summer of 1962,
national CORE had difficulties meeting their payroll expenses and forced the staff to go
on half-pay.97 Failing to handle their funds properly while not preparing for a future
crippled the organization once the funding stopped. The lack of foresight in the
organization is especially troubling given the organization's rollercoaster history with
activity and funding.
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However, the influx of membership also strained CORE. There were too many
individuals entering the organization too rapidly and the chapters were not providing the
proper training in nonviolent methods. Without this training, these new black members
expressed more skepticism of nonviolent methods as well as a yearning for black
separatism in the organization. Spurred on by the Black Muslims, Malcolm X, and the
emergence of Black Power, CORE experienced the implosion of some chapters due to
ideological differences. For example, the Detroit chapter controversy began because of
concern the chapter was too white. The chapter divided between the members who
either believed CORE should be a blacks only organization, or at least all leadership
should be African American and the members who believed CORE should remain
integrated with democratic voting. The chapter split as blacks and whites separated into
their own groups. In the New Orleans CORE chapter white members quit after
interracial dating was banned by African American leaders. Newark and Baltimore
CORE both saw ―anti-white‖ debates overwhelm their chapters. National CORE
remained unsure how to deal with Black Power and finally attempted to distort the
meaning for organizational use. Farmer argued that Black Power meant ―building
equality and trying to organize the Negro community politically and economically.‖ 98 In
the Northeast, especially in densely populated urban areas that had a high population of
African Americans, Black Power ideology spread rapidly within the local chapters.
However, in smaller cities and as the media and other militant organizations utilized a
radical definition, the contradictory usage of Black Power only confused CORE
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members and recruits across the country. Furthermore, the spread of Black Power was
also driven by a lack of results at the local level. While the South witnessed advances
against Jim Crow and disfranchisement, the local Northern chapters were still inundated
with job, housing, and education discrimination. There was a distinct division between
the Northern and Southern chapters of CORE regarding the results of the movement.
In the South, even the small advancements seemed monumental; however the progress
of the civil rights movement had little effect on the North. Northern chapters such as
Brooklyn, Harlem, Detroit, and Baltimore are highly reflective of this division. Each of
these chapters were driven to militancy because the advancements of the movement
did not appease these chapters' memberships.
The chief impetus for black militancy in CORE came from a sense of failure. For
instance, after years of minimal success in Brooklyn, fatigue and frustration set in for
Brooklyn CORE by 1964. Desiring changes that affected them personally, the Brooklyn
chapter elected an entirely new leadership and pushed a far more radical agenda.
Their planned demonstrations for the 1964-1965 New York World‘s Fair became an
organizational wide dilemma.99 Brooklyn CORE created a plan that would intentionally
stall cars on highways and picket subways to limit access to the fair. The ―stall-ins‖
were created to attract attention to the racial discrimination in the urban North as well as
to voice displeasure with unfavorable hiring practices at all the pavilions within the fair.
Brooklyn CORE leader, Isaiah Brunson, threatened that over 2000 cars "would run out
99
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of gas on the way to the fair" if the chapter's demands - "integrated crews on all city
construction sites, better inner-city housing conditions, total desegregation of public
schools, and a citizen-based review board of complains of police brutality" - were not
met.100 The national director of CORE, James Farmer, responded in a newspaper
article that the stall-ins would ―merely create confusion and thus damage the fight for
freedom.‖101 Farmer suspended Brooklyn CORE and the entire chapter‘s roster. In a
letter to Brooklyn CORE, Farmer wrote ―your chapter and all members thereof are
immediately ordered to refrain from making public statements and any news releases or
taking any actions in the name of CORE.‖102 The chapter ignored the demands of the
national director and continued their stall-in plans. Other chapters and organizations
supported Brooklyn CORE‘s plans and wrote directly to Farmer himself asking the
national organization ―to settle the differences with the Brooklyn chapter.‖103 If anything,
the suspensions fueled Brooklyn CORE‘s resolve. Instead of rethinking their strategy,
―Brooklyn CORE reveled in their status as a radical chapter.‖104 Despite the suspension
and protest of the plan by national CORE, the organization could not stop the stall-ins.
The suspension was lifted, the stall-ins were executed, and national CORE could act
only to limit the damage of the stall-ins. In hope of diluting any negative national press,
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CORE set up more moderate demonstrations inside the fair.105 However, the stall-ins
"were much weaker than police and fair authorities had feared" according to the Wall
Street Journal.106 Lack of control over the local chapters was a major issue for national
CORE and led to many Northern chapters rejecting nonviolence and embracing
militancy. In addition, the summer riots of 1964 and 1965 in New York, New Jersey,
Chicago, and California only increased the desire to use retaliatory violence in those
regions of the organization.107
In 1964, Farmer came under scrutiny; his leadership and his marriage with a
white woman were targeted by more radical members of the local chapters. When
Farmer "suddenly departed for a month-long African trip at the end of 1964, leaving the
organization with an acute financial crisis and other unsolved problems," CORE spiraled
into a struggle over leadership. The National Action Committee led by Floyd McKissick
attacked Farmer and the national office. At the same time the legitimacy of retaliatory
violence threatened the nonviolent methods of CORE. With the sudden upsurge in
funding that accompanied the popularity of the Freedom Rides, CORE experienced
massive membership expansion in 1964. The quick rise in membership was followed
by an equally rapid decline in activity and donations that left the organization with a
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$200,000 deficit.108

The following year, the trend continued adding another $220,000

to the deficit.109
Debt hampered the organization as it spiraled back into the ineffectiveness and
obscurity of the 1950s. With mounting unhappiness regarding the direction of the
organization in national CORE, Farmer stepped down from his position as national
director in 1966. Farmer was a brilliant orator, yet he lacked the bureaucratic skills of
CORE's previous leader, James Robinson. Before Robinson CORE suffered from
inactivity, poor funding and instability. The organization was on the brink of collapse
until Robinson turned it around. Under Robinson's leadership the organization's
contributors nearly tripled from 4,500 to 12,000; funds grew from $8,200 yearly in 1955
to $144,000 in 1961; and the number of chapters quintupled from seven to thirty-five
including the eleven pending approval.110 Nonetheless, Robinson came under fire.
National Action Committee members argued Robinson's personality impeded CORE in
its external relationships; In a letter to the National Action Committee member, Marvin
Rich wrote "[Robinson] is not an adequate image of the forceful, aggressive yet
responsible organization. He is unable to meet with the leaders of other organizations
and represent us. He is inadequate as a public figure in the press or on television and
radio."111 Soon after the National Action Committee replaced Robinson with Farmer.
While a brilliant orator, Farmer lacked the bureaucratic skills of Robinson and CORE
rapidly returned to the instability of the 1940s and early 1950s despite the record
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increases in activity and funding. Farmer may have been exactly what the National
Action Committee wanted, however, Robinson was the leader CORE needed.
Farmer would be replaced by separatist proponent Floyd McKissick after
McKissick won a twenty person vote (12-8) held by CORE's National Action Committee,
the same committee that elected Farmer over Robinson. The election of McKissick was
highly criticized by local chapters, with some, rebelling as they had no voice in the
decision to elect McKissick. Under McKissick‘s guidance, the organization shifted in
―new direction‖ to a separatist militant organization. McKissick moved national CORE
headquarters to Harlem, then in June at a march in Jackson, Mississippi, he declared
―1966 shall be remembered as the year we left our imposed status of Negroes and
became Black Men… 1966 is the year of the concept of Black Power. The year when
black men realized their full worth in society—their dignity and their beauty—and their
power—the greatest power on the earth – the power of right.‖112
The election of McKissick and his first actions as national director disenchanted
the white members of the local chapters; they turned away from the organization in
droves. With a mounting debt that reached over a million dollars in 1968 and a growing
anti-McKissick sentiment in the organization, McKissick knew it was time to leave. He
resigned from CORE to found his Soul City project in North Carolina. The Soul City
project was an intended multi-racial community, built from the ground up with all the
infrastructure to prosper in one area. It was supposed to be a community where one
could live without fear or discrimination. This rural utopian society was meant to be an
112
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alternative to the overcrowded cities. Despite being well funded, it was ultimately a
failure due to poor organization and planning. After McKissick, and a brief interim
period by Lincoln Lynch, Roy Innis was selected to assume the role of national director
by September of 1968. Shortly after his ascension to power Innis finished what
McKissick had started; he declared the Congress of Racial Equality a Black Nationalist
Organization. One of his first press releases declared the organization ―once and for
all… Separatist – a system under which blacks would control their own destiny.‖ 113 This
was the final nail in the coffin for the white members of CORE and for the organization
itself. CORE still exists today but only as a shell of its old identity. Since the shift to
Black Nationalism the organization has existed in name only. In the words of James
Farmer from an interview in 1993, "CORE has no functioning chapters; it holds no
conventions, no elections, no meetings, sets no policies, has no social programs and
does no fund-raising. In my opinion, CORE is fraudulent.‖114
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CHAPTER II: SEATTLE CORE “TAKING OFF”

The history of the Seattle chapter of CORE starkly contrasts to the national
Congress of Racial Equality. Even though the local affiliate employed the same policies
and faced similar problems in raising funds, achieving results with their activism, and a
movement towards militancy in Seattle, the national organization the two blazed very
different paths. The following chapter explores the early history of Seattle CORE, the
impact of the founding members, the first direct action campaign, and a reorganization
that set the affiliate up for sustained success into the future.
The efforts by the founding group established Seattle CORE as one of the
strongest affiliates in the national organization. Each of these early members were
motivated by a common desire: to change the racially divided city of Seattle. Many of
the first participants were part of, or leaders in, local civil rights organizations and
churches; this previous experience greatly benefited the development of Seattle CORE.
In addition, the founding group put an emphasis on African American leadership and
involvement that legitimized the chapter in the eyes of the black community. This
relationship flourished as Seattle CORE earned a reputation for forcing employers to
abandon discriminatory hiring practices in the early 1960s.

47

Building the Foundation of Seattle CORE

In a chance meeting in May of 1961, four white strangers met during intermission
of a showing of the play Raisin in the Sun; the four, Ray Cooper, Ken Rose, and Ed and
Joan Singler, were moved by the message of hope in the play as well as the events of
the Freedom Rides in the South.115 After it concluded they met with one of the actors,
Norman Johnson, and the conversation quickly shifted from the play‘s message to the
civil rights movement and the segregation in their hometown of Seattle. The group
decided to meet again to discuss what they could do; during that second meeting the
Seattle chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality was born. This was not the first time
Seattle activists attempted to bring a CORE affiliate to the city. A few years earlier a
group led by Don Matson failed to rally enough support to establish a chapter. With the
reinvigoration in the civil rights movement driven by the black student demonstrations in
the South, Seattle CORE ―took off.‖116 Seeing the walls that were falling in the South,
African Americans in Seattle were also more motivated to object to the discrimination in
their own city.
Matson was instrumental in establishing Seattle CORE on the second attempt.
He brought organizing skills, leadership, and a wide network of contacts to the newly
founded chapter. At the time he also led a small committee of Unitarians for Social
Justice (USJ); an organization devoted to integration. This committee included Doris
Eason, Jean Jones, Mary Barton, and John Cornethan; who all joined Seattle CORE
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that summer.117 Matson recruited heavily for the organization. He first contacted the
individuals interested in CORE when he attempted to establish a chapter in 1957. This
included some of the most influential members in Seattle CORE‘s history including Ray
Williams, Walt Hundley, and Ivan King, among others.118 These three in particular,
played significant leadership roles in the chapter; Williams became the first chairman of
Seattle CORE and was instrumental in organizing the chapter at its infancy, Hundley
held the position of vice chairman in 1964 and chairman in 1965, and was the chapter's
representative on the Central Area Civil Rights Committee, and King, who was on the
staff of the Urban League of Metropolitan Seattle, played a major part in the fight
against education discrimination. He also wrote the Triad Plan that was presented to
the Seattle School Board in 1965 that proposed to end segregation in Seattle
schools.119 Moreover, Matson utilized his relationships with local churches to spread
information to the black community. The churches would provide some of the strongest
support for Seattle CORE. In addition, Matson opened his home to CORE members,
and many nights he and other activists toiled in his basement using an old mimeograph
machine to create the leaflets and flyers that they would pass out at demonstrations. 120
From the beginning Matson was an essential member to the development of Seattle
CORE.
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The first goal of the chapter was to raise the funds necessary to send Ray
Cooper to the Jim Crow South to partake in the Freedom Rides.121 Through their own
donations, and using local church connections through Matson, the chapter paid to fly
Cooper to New Orleans for his Freedom Rider training. After training Cooper and his
fellow Freedom Riders rode a bus to Jackson Mississippi. Upon their arrival they were
immediately arrested and sent to Hinds County Jail. Sid Gerber, who helped create the
first ―Freedom Now‖ button for Seattle CORE, used those funds along with some of his
own personal money to bail Cooper out of jail.122
That July, the group met to establish the bureaucracy of the chapter. First, they
elected the officers to fill the four positions of chairman, vice chairman, treasurer and
secretary. The group believed African Americans should lead this struggle for their
equality and elected Ray Williams as the first chairman of Seattle CORE. Ed Singler
was elected the first vice chairman, and also provided legal counsel for the chapter.
Norman Johnson was elected the first Treasurer and the chapter also elected Ken Rose
as its first secretary. However, Williams who had a full-time job, a family to care for, and
was an advisor with several other organizations, stepped down after only three months
as chairman, as he could not give the position the attention it required.123 Ed Singler
would assume the position until the next elections were held and would be the only
white chairman in the history of Seattle CORE. Seattle CORE decided to hold annual
elections in November for the officers and no person could retain their position in
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consecutive years. In addition, the chapter added a new position by the next election,
assistant secretary to help with the increased work load as the chapter expanded. The
five official positions that led the chapter would be recognized as the Executive
Committee.
The small group of five that started the campaign to bring a chapter of CORE to
Seattle had already reached 30 by the end of July; making Seattle CORE one of the
three largest chapters of CORE in the West.124 The chapter also setup their mandatory
orientations for new members; these training sessions were led by Matson. Once a
month the chapter held an orientation meeting and training in nonviolence seminar that
were mandatory to partake in any of Seattle CORE‘s direct action projects. After
finishing the required training, and committing to the nonviolent rules of the organization
each applicant would have to pass, a two-thirds vote by active members, to be accepted
into the chapter. If the applicant‘s vote passed, they would then choose between
becoming an active member or an associate member. Active members were assessed
a $2.00 yearly fee and had the rights to vote on other applicants, vote in the annual
elections for officials, and vote on issues in the chapter. Associate members were
charged only $1.00 yearly dues but did not have the ability to vote.125
The large membership roster eased the financial burden for Seattle CORE, but
the founding group also aggressively attacked fund raising; not only for the chapter but
for national CORE as well. On top of the ―Freedom Now‖ buttons they sold and the
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dues fees they collected, the chapter raised funds by raffling items off such as tickets to
the 1962 Seattle World‘s Fair or professional basketball games. They also received
healthy donations from members of the chapter. Ed O‘Keefe in particular donated every
month; his donations ranged from $10 to $150.126 At this early stage Seattle CORE had
relatively no problems with raising funds. The community, especially local churches,
was more than willing to donate to Seattle CORE and the chapter assisted national
CORE financially on a monthly basis.
The election of African American members as the leaders of the chapter helped
establish a relationship within the Black community. The founding members held a
belief that blacks should lead the fight for their own equality; the white members were
only there to help. In comparison, national CORE was founded by a majority of white
members, and these individuals mostly made up the National Action Committee.
National CORE never established the foothold in the black community like other civil
rights group, or even, some of CORE's local chapters did.

First Call to Action

Seattle CORE investigated local department stores, banks, and grocery store
chains for evidence of hiring discrimination. As part of CORE procedure, each chapter
must ―investigate the facts carefully to determine whether or not racial injustice existed.‖
Furthermore, direct action would only be taken if no solution could be found through
126
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negotiations.127 Groups were sent out to survey the number of minority employees and
potential discrimination at local businesses; sometimes even asking employees directly
about their employer‘s hiring practices. Safeway Supermarkets emerged as the worst
offender, ―with three stores in the Central Area that had an 80 percent customer base
from the black community, only a handful of employees were black.‖128 In addition, no
minority held a managerial position in any of the Supermarkets investigated.129 Within
the Central Area, only 6 of more than 1,700 Safeway employees in King County, were
black.130 The Seattle chapter of the NAACP had previously negotiated with Safeway
Supermarkets to no benefit, so Seattle CORE decided to take immediate action against
the company. Using the local churches to spread the word through the Black
community, Seattle CORE hoped for a large turnout at their first direct action campaign.
On a hot day in August 1961, Seattle CORE took their newly created chapter to
the predominantly black neighborhoods surrounding Safeway Supermarkets. In each
region CORE members went door to door to pass out hundreds of leaflets reminding
local black citizens ―Don‘t Shop Where You Can‘t Work!,‖ ―Quit Buying Discrimination,‖
"Return Your Charge Card!" and "Shop in Other Areas Now!" 131 The goal of the
leafleting campaign was to force unwanted attention onto Safeway Supermarkets and to
persuade the local managers to begin using fair hiring practices. At the bottom of the
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leaflets, there was a voucher that could be completed and returned back to Seattle
CORE for those looking for work. The voucher stated ―I am available for supermarket
work immediately;‖ provided mailing directions; space for the person‘s name, age,
address, phone number and asked if they needed training for this work.132 Since the
chapter did not have official offices a mailbox was activated to receive the vouchers.
CORE received nearly a hundred returned job vouchers from the Safeway
leafleting campaign. Without delay CORE‘s Co-chairman, Wallace Johnson,
established a program to train those individuals needing work. Johnson created the
program to develop the skills necessary to obtain employment and work in a
supermarket. There were interview simulations, customer-employee role play, and
math building skills related to cashiering.133 The program not only helped job seekers
but gave CORE an idea of how qualified the individuals were, and where they were
applying. The chapter used these individuals to test the hiring practices of individual
stores.
During the ensuing negotiations with Safeway Supermarkets CORE provided the
evidence they gathered on the company. Only three stores employed African
Americans out of thirty eight in King County, and in those three stores, only six
employees were black.134 Safeway refuted the statistics arguing that they only hired
people who lived close to a store, that many of their locations were in all white
neighborhoods, that among black applicants they could not find many qualified
132
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individuals, that stores were not hiring currently and any recent applicants had not been
considered.135
As the negotiations stalled, Seattle CORE decided to test the claims made by
Safeway Supermarkets as a way to gather more evidence against the company. They
sent interview teams to speak with the managers in 25 of the 38 stores to get answers
to a specific list of questions. The teams identified themselves as ―people engaged in
an employment survey‖ and asked a series of questions relating to the hiring practices
that Safeway provided during negotiations. Questions focused on where employees
lived, the number of minorities employed by the store, and if they were hiring or had
recently hired anyone.136 Seattle CORE also staked out the stores to verify the
accuracy of the answers they received. After a four week investigation, the organization
had the proof they needed to stage demonstrations. The results of their experiment
confirmed Seattle CORE‘s suspicions, distance from the store had no bearing on
employment status. Only six employees were black out of the 581 employees; and
most importantly, thirty-one people – all white – had been hired since the negotiations
started.137
With the evidence in hand, Seattle CORE decided it was time to escalate their
campaign against the grocery store chain; and staged their first set of direct action
protests. With assistance from the NAACP and local Baptist ministers, CORE spread
the word of their upcoming boycott. On the morning of their planned picketing, the
135
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group of participants met at the NAACP office. There the rules were laid out for all the
members:
1) Do not respond to jeers and insulting remarks – ignore these.
2) Those participating in the demonstrations will dress neatly. Women no slacks
please.
3) pick up any leaflets that are thrown on the ground.
4) And finally, ―this is a nonviolent demonstration… if you feel at anytime you can
no longer remain non-violent, report to the picket captain and excuse yourself
from the line immediately.‖138
Friday October 27 1961, was the first day of the ―Selective Buying Campaign.‖
The group chose to target the Safeway at 23rd and Union. About fifty activists from
CORE and the NAACP carried fliers, signs, and sang songs. Very few customers
crossed the line and the news quickly spread of the demonstrations. The following day,
an unexpected large number of the local black community showed up to boycott. So
many came that the demonstration had to be split into two, with a second Safeway
Supermarket being targeted on Saturday.139 Two days later, Safeway Supermarkets
contacted CORE to request immediate resumption of the negotiations. This time
Safeway Supermarkets not only agreed to hire black workers, but also opened a branch
employment office at the Safeway Store to help train and recruit black workers. Within
two months Safeway had hired 22 black employees, with many outside the Central
Area.140 Seattle CORE‘s first direct action project was a major success, not only for the
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newly employed black citizens of Seattle. It also showed the members of the chapter
exactly how powerful nonviolence could be.
In December, the chapter wrote a constitution and bylaws, actions which were
necessary for completion of their application to obtain recognition as an official CORE
chapter. Even though they had already begun nonviolent activism against Safeway and
financed two Freedom Riders, it was not unusual for a chapter to be active while it was
pending national approval. At the same time Seattle CORE was awaiting official
recognition, eight other chapters were under review and six of those were already
actively participating in the civil rights movement under the name of CORE.141 The
Seattle activists launched the CORElator, a monthly newsletter designed to keep
members up to date on their CORE activities. The CORElator would be produced by the
secretary and the newly added position of assistant secretary. It was not until February
of 1962, that the chapter was officially recognized by national CORE as one of its
affiliates.142
That same month, Seattle CORE was selected to host the Freedom Ride film.
The documentary captured the journey of Freedom Riders and would be screened
across the state. Ray Cooper would travel with the film and retell his own Freedom
Rides story at each showing. The chapter received a portion of the ticket income as

141
142

Meier and Rudwick, 150.
Singler and others, 24.

57

well as many donations at the showings and the local publicity helped increase
membership.143

Seattle CORE Targets Employment

Seattle CORE focused solely on employment discrimination for the first two years
of its existence. After Safeway the chapter targeted Lucky and Foodland grocery stores
along with The Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, better known as A&P Supermarkets,
with varying degrees of success. With each enterprise the chapter gained valuable
experience that would enhance their influence in the future; however, it was a small
group of members doing most of the work. Despite having over fifty active members,
only a handful knew the elements of negotiations and the effort it took behind the
scenes to run the chapter.
In May of 1962 Seattle CORE began negotiations with Lucky‘s Supermarkets
that went through November. The negotiations once again proved unsuccessful.
Following the same investigative and training tactics that worked so well in preparation
for their first boycott, Seattle CORE launched another Selective Buying Campaign. On
the second day of picketing the store manager came out and told the picket captain that
Lucky‘s hiring policy would change. In less than one day Seattle CORE produced the
results months of negotiations did not. In one month the number of black employees
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went from five to eleven, and within ten months, Lucky‘s increased that total to
fourteen.144
There were two factors prohibiting Seattle CORE from quickly organizing against
many grocery stores. First, the chapter used only a handful of trusted members
comprised mostly of the founding members and elected officers to negotiate with
companies. At times Seattle CORE was in negotiations with up to fifteen businesses at
once.145 Second, the chapter faced deceptive tactics by the employers. CORE
investigators showed that Safeway blatantly lied about a policy of only hiring individuals
who lived nearby as well as claims that they were not hiring at the time of negotiations.
Other supermarkets gave in during negotiations just to rid themselves of Seattle CORE;
then resumed their discriminatory practices. In the spring of 1962, the chapter began
negotiations with A&P Supermarkets. At the time the A&P had zero African American
employees out of over four hundred in the Seattle area.146 Without any direct action,
A&P agreed to hire black employees; there were three immediate hires and promises to
continue this practice. After the initial hires A&P did not live up to the agreement and,
over the next few months, the grocery chain returned to their discriminatory methods; no
new blacks were hired for the next six months. Seattle CORE pressured A&P in ongoing
negotiations and A&P hired more black workers.147 But once again, after the initial
hires, no more black workers were employed. A year after negotiations began, the
chapter decided to take action against A&P based on the grocery chain's continued
144

―Survey of Seattle Lucky and Foodland Stores,‖ August 19, 1963, Seattle CORE Collection.
Singler and others, 49.
146
―A&P Report,‖ March 1962, CORE Papers.
147
CORElator, October 1962, CORE Papers.
145

59

practice designed to placate CORE negotiators without substantive change.148 After the
first set of demonstrations A&P once again negotiated and hired two black employees
and agreed to continue; once again they did not fulfill their side of the agreement after
the initial hires.
In December 1963, A&P came to another agreement with Seattle CORE. This
time, with pressure from local newspapers and significant publicity including a press
release by A&P committing publicly to an agreement, Seattle CORE believed the
settlement would be adhered to by the company. According to the Seattle Times, the
agreement between A&P and Seattle CORE was a ―major advance toward equal job
opportunities‖ and it ―assures that jobs and advancement will continue to be available to
the qualified person, regardless of race color or creed.‖149 This agreement did not end
the discriminatory hiring practices of the A&P.
Targeting employment was a crucial move for Seattle CORE. The chapter
showed the black community their efforts were not in vain. Conversely, national CORE
targeted elusive goals or challenged national laws that made the impact of the national
organization unclear. Blacks outside the South saw more benefits through the actions
of local groups. Albeit very minor, the gains made by Seattle CORE versus job
discrimination had a significant impact in the local black community.
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Reorganization

In 1963, newly elected chairman, Reginald Alleyne, acted to improve the
chapter.150 Alleyne, was a graduate from Howard University who had studied labor law
and was a very active member in the chapter. By Seattle‘s membership had grown to
over one hundred members establishing the chapter as the largest on the west coast.
Alleyne recognized the chapter needed to find a quick and fair way to mobilize the
chapter‘s efforts, improve their policies to handle the increased membership, and lower
the workload on the officers. To this point, all decisions were based on a majority vote
from active members; however, this process was time-consuming and sometimes
delayed the handling of pressing issues. The chapter established an Emergency
Committee; a group of fifteen consisting of all five officers and ten elected active
members with the power to dictate policy. The group met weekly in addition to the
regular monthly chapter meetings.151 The chapter expanded the number of negotiators
to spread out the workload. The formal Negotiation Committee led by Walt Hundley and
Jean Adams established negotiation criteria and addressed workload issues.152
The Negotiation Committee first established the rules for negotiations.
Negotiation teams would consist of three to four individuals who had an individuals with
defined roles.. The spokesman was the leader of the group and was required to be
African American; the secretary, recorded the facts and figures of the negotiations; the

150

Letter regarding 1962 Annual Elections to James McCain from Seattle CORE, December, 1963. Reel
20:167, Series III, Addendum to CORE Papers.
151
Singler and others, 44.
152
Ibid, 48.

61

third member‘s role was to support the points made by the spokesman with the
evidence accumulated by the chapter, and the fourth member if necessary was an
expert on the subject at hand.153 The negotiating teams could not make the final
decision on negotiations. This was left up to the elected officers known as the
Executive Committee. Adams established the documentation guidelines for keeping
records and communication. Hundley, who acted as spokesperson in several
negotiations, created a training program that would teach CORE members how to
properly negotiate. This training simulated a series of negotiations, in which individuals
served on a negotiating team, each member gained experience in all three team roles.
This program quickly provided the chapter with over thirty negotiators and enabled
Seattle CORE to actively negotiate with several organizations simultaneously.154
Building a strong foundation and establishing relationships in the black
community were key to the success of Seattle CORE. The relationships built with local
churches paid great dividends to the chapter. Not only did the church leaders identify
problems in the black community and assist with negotiations, the churches also
provided a stream of membership, funding and an open channel of communication with
the black community. Having the local church leaders working actively with Seattle
CORE legitimized the organization within the black community. This relationship drove
more black members to Seattle CORE and even though the chapter made only modest
strides towards equality, the black community saw their effort result in new jobs.
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Seattle CORE first targeted employment discrimination; starting with Safeway
Supermarkets in 1961. Following the strict guidelines of the "Rules for Action" laid out
by national CORE, the local affiliate confirmed suspected discrimination. With proof in
hand, the chapter reached out to negotiate; however, neither grocery chain was willing
to change their hiring policies. Seattle CORE leapt into action with boycotts and
picketing that forced the supermarket chains to negotiate. The negotiations resulted in
token hires to appease the chapter and stop the activism against their stores.
By the end of 1963 Seattle CORE was well established in the black community.
Their exploits in assisting African Americans in training and obtaining jobs were well
known. They had a large membership of black members, one of the healthiest of all
CORE affiliates, and the chapter made extra efforts to have African Americans at the
forefront of the organization in various leadership roles. The reorganization of the
chapter enabled Seattle CORE to handle their growing membership roster and further
expansion of their activism against other aspects of discrimination in the city. While
employment was always the main priority, the chapter ventured into housing and
education discrimination in the upcoming years.
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CHAPTER III: DECEPTION, DEMOCRACY, DISSENSION, AND DEEDS

After setting up the chapter for continued expansion and sustained
success, Seattle CORE moved into a period of ambiguity. This era witnessed many
highs and lows for the civil rights group. First, with a blossoming relationship in the black
community, the affiliate reached a peak in membership that made the chapter one of the
most active in all of CORE. In addition, Seattle CORE had one of the healthiest white to
black ratios in the organization. Yet, when the local affiliate ventured into housing
discrimination cases, they were overwhelmed by the discriminatory practices of realtors
and the Seattle Real Estate Board.
After failing to achieve any progress in the housing sector, the chapter returned
to the fight against employment discrimination; and in doing so, they founded a new,
highly successful, method to achieve results against discriminatory grocery stores. To
stop deceptive tactics normally employed by the grocery chains, the local chapter
invented a tactic they called the "Shop-in" that changed the dynamic of the negotiations
and forced Safeway and Tradewell to adjust their hiring practices. After the grocery
store chains, the chapter set their sights on ending the de facto segregation created by
Seattle's housing situation and transforming the racially divided downtown area of the
city. The chapter created their largest and most ambitious project, the Drive for Equal
Employment in Downtown Seattle (DEEDS). However, by the beginning of 1965 internal
turmoil and a colossal failure of the chapter‘s pet project had overwhelmed the chapter.
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Targeting Housing Discrimination

After solely focusing on employment discrimination, Seattle CORE looked at the
housing segregation within the city. This started in the summer of 1963 as Seattle
CORE established a Housing Committee, led by Joan Singler.155 At this time, Seattle
neighborhoods were heavily segregated. The white neighborhoods, consisting of nearly
all of the homes outside the Central Area, refused to sell or lease to potential black
buyers no matter how qualified they were. Seattle CORE believed the realtors rather
than the sellers dictated selling practices in the white neighborhoods, even more so
than the sellers. However, the Housing Committee had to prove this under the
guidelines of national CORE‘s ―Rules for Action.‖
The Housing Committee devised simple tests to evaluate the realtors. Seattle
CORE sent out one black couple, who inquired about sale or lease, tried to arrange a
showing, inquired about pricing, and established their interest in acquiring a property.
Later that day, Seattle CORE would send out a white couple to do the same. In each
case the realty company had signed an agreement with the State Board Against
Discrimination promising that their company would not use discriminatory practices.
The Housing Committee‘s experiments found the discrimination they expected. The
committee conducted tests from May 25, 1963 to October 20 of the same year.156 In
every case the black couple could not view the home they desired or they were quoted
a significantly higher price than the white couple. Sometimes the black couple was told
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the house had been sold already, only to have the white couple be shown the home
hours later. Even more shocking were the ways the companies mistreated the black
couple. Some of the companies closed their offices as the black couple approached, or
did not show up for appointments leaving the couple waiting for hours. 157 In addition,
the Housing Committee discovered similar tactics were used when they tested
apartment leasing. CORE documented their testing and sent copies of their report to
the Seattle City Council, the Washington State Board Against Discrimination, and
federal, state, and local government officials. The chapter received no response from
any of these governmental agencies.158
CORE decided to take the matter into their own hands. In July 1963, they
launched ―Operation Windowshop.‖ The idea was simple; black couples interested in
purchasing a home would visit ―open houses‖ outside the Central Area.159 To promote
the idea, CORE used the same tactics they had utilized when rallying against
employment discrimination; spread the word through the local churches and other civil
rights organizations, as well as, initiate a leafleting campaign in the black
neighborhoods in Seattle.
CORE drew so much attention to Operation Windowshop that they were
―shocked‖ by what would happen next.160 On the planned weekend for Operation
Windowshop, the real estate industry in Seattle shut down. Real estate agencies
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closed for the weekend and open houses were canceled. Even more shocking, the
actions was taken on the instructions of the Seattle Real Estate Board, which also
flooded the Seattle Times with ads against the demonstration.161 One ad claimed that
sole purpose was to ―disrupt and invade the homes of peaceful citizens.‖162 With
Operation Windowshop thwarted, the Housing Committee attempted to open
negotiations with the Seattle Real Estate Board. Seattle CORE recruited some allies in
the NAACP and from local churches to assist. However, the Seattle Real Estate Board
responded ―…since there was no problem and no discrimination by realtors, there would
be no point in meeting.‖163
Already embroiled in the picketing of A&P stores, Seattle CORE tried a more
political approach to address housing discrimination. On two separate occasions CORE
presented evidence to the Citizens‘ Advisory Committee, an ordinance was put to vote
that would penalize realtor companies found guilty of discrimination. An ―Open Housing
Ordinance‖ was passed and scheduled to be placed on the ballot for the next general
election. However, Seattle CORE quickly found itself on the defensive. The Seattle
Real Estate Board distributed flyers that claimed the ordinance would create forced
housing if passed.164 Realty agencies played on fears that property values would drop
and the Apartment Operators Association ―threatened a criminal record for any landlord
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who rented ‗to a person of your choice.‘‖165 Spurred on by the fear campaigns, Seattle
voters defeated the ordinance by a two to one margin on March 10, 1964.166
Seattle CORE‘s overall progress was slow to say the least. A handful of jobs
here and there at local grocery stores barely scratched the surface of employment
discrimination in Seattle. Their Open Housing Ordinance was defeated by the residents
of Seattle. While most were happy that progress was being made, the frustration and a
feeling of ineffectiveness began to creep into the chapter. Members expected far more
results than they achieved and worried that, at the rate they were going, ―…it would take
700 years for Negroes to secure jobs‖ at a percentage equal to white workers. 167 The
failure of the Open Housing Ordinance only added to the unrest overtaking the chapter
and Seattle CORE would never focus on housing discrimination again. The
unhappiness within the organization boiled over in the summer of 1964.

Shop-in with Seattle CORE

The struggle with the A&P returned in March of 1964. The same old cycle had
continued and Seattle CORE, fed up with the lies of the A&P negotiators, decided to
resume direct action protests by March. This time would be different; they were going
to do something that would force the A&P to make substantial changes in their hiring
practices. Seattle CORE also wanted to make a bigger statement than their previous
165
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boycotts. Their brainstorming produced an initiative they called a ―shop-in.‖ The shopin placed activists inside the store as well as on the streets. Their aim was to slow
down the business of the A&P and hurt the company in a way that would be noticeable.
Some Seattle CORE members worried about the shop-ins, as they were more
aggressive than prior direct action. The activists anticipated hostility from employees
and even other shoppers. To combat this, the project required special training to
prepare for the potential for violent responses. The chapter decided to train enough
members so they could grind business to a halt for hours and every activist had to
partake in the extensive nonviolent training session.
Seattle CORE also set some guidelines for the shop-in; they wanted to remain
courteous to the regular shoppers and they did not allow perishable items to be put in
the carts. If someone broke an item, they had to pay for it.168 The chapter did not want
the shop-in to look like vandalism with the destruction of A&P‘s merchandise. Their
goal was to frustrate A&P employees, educate shoppers and turn away potential
customers who saw the demonstration underway.
Seattle CORE led successful shop-ins at three different A&P locations. The
demonstration was simple yet effective. A large group of Seattle CORE members
loaded up shopping carts with non-perishable items, and proceeded to the checkout
counter. After the cashier rang them out, the activist informed the clerk that ―they did
not want the groceries and were not going to shop at the A&P because of its
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discriminatory hiring practices.‖169 What seemed to be an extra busy day, turned into a
nightmare for the grocery store. Checkout lines backed up into the aisles with a mix of
demonstrators and real customers. Rows of carts full of merchandise lined the front of
the store as A&P employees were too busy to put them away. At every checkout lane
cashiers frantically tried to keep up with what looked like long lines of shoppers with full
carts. Real customers had difficulty even securing an empty cart for shopping and
many left without making a purchase.170
The A&P Shop-in demonstrates a change in Seattle CORE. Frustrated with
A&P‘s deceptive negotiations, the shop-in was far more radical than previous protests.
There was nothing the chapter could do if A&P agreed to changes during negotiations
made a small gesture then returned to their old discriminatory practices; once an
agreement was made and A&P went through with the hiring of black workers, CORE
had to relent on their direct action campaigns. Thus, Seattle CORE realized they
needed to do something significant to scare the company, and the shop-ins did just that.
The back-and-forth negotiations that had lasted over two years but finally came to end
with the shop-in demonstrations and cost A&P Supermarkets over $4,000 a week.171
A&P agreed to live up to the previous terms established in the last set of negotiations
and within four days they hired six black employees.172 The shop-ins in March and April
were the last activism Seattle CORE would need to use against the A&P. Over the next
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months A&P changed their hiring practices and African American workers could be
found at all fifteen of their store locations in the Seattle area.173
A&P Supermarkets were not the only grocery store to face the shop-in
demonstrations. Two Tradewell Supermarkets locations also faced Seattle CORE‘s
new shop-in tactic in July of 1964. The first occurred on July 1st. Activists inside the
store refused to pay for shopping carts full of goods, while Seattle CORE members on
the outside passed out leaflets explaining the circumstances that had produced the
shop-in. Flyers read ―Seattle CORE has been negotiating with Tradewell for over two
years… CORE knows of qualified Negro applicants who have applied at Tradewell and
have not been hired when openings were available… Token Hiring is Not Enough,
Support Equal Job Opportunity.‖174 A week later on July 18, Tradewell hired ten black
workers.175 The chapter announced the end of the boycott against Tradewell Stores on
July 30th.176
While the shop-ins against the A&P and Tradewell successfully forced a change
in two discriminatory businesses; they also had a negative effect on the chapter. The
shop-ins emboldened some members after they witnessed the immediate impact of a
more aggressive approach had on companies. It became difficult to maintain
investigation and negotiation tactics prior to active demonstration as some of the newer
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members felt the discrimination was too obvious to spend time investigating. With many
members attracted to Seattle CORE due to ―dramatic nightly portrayals of racial
injustice;‖ the new wave of members were not as disciplined as the first members of the
chapter despite the training in nonviolence.177 One Seattle CORE member said the
chapter ―was growing faster than we can assimilate the numerous capable new people
and ideas and is becoming a big structure.‖178 Even with the monumental passing of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on July 1st and the success with the shop-ins, some of the
African American members of the chapter were not seeing the results they expected.
These members of Seattle CORE desired a more militant approach and some wished
for separation from white activists. During the spring and summer of 1964, these
members made an attempt to take over the chapter.

Dissension

Between the shop-ins, Seattle CORE began picketing Picture Floor Plans, a real
estate company based in the city. During these demonstrations, a group of new Seattle
CORE members violated the CORE Rules for Action. Longtime CORE members
registered complaints that this group ignored the mandatory check-in with the picket
captains, and refused to follow directions. Instead of peacefully demonstrating, they
aggressively provoked reactions, engaged in verbal arguments, and confronted Picture
Floor Plans employees. Led by six members of Seattle CORE including the assistant
177
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secretary, the dissenting group was called ―The Faction.‖179 In Seattle in Black and
White, Singler, Durning, Valentine, and Adams wrote "members of the Faction seemed
to need to prove their commitment by lengthy picketing, sometimes lasting all day, in
contrast to the more usual two or three hour shifts—commendable dedication but with
the potential for escalating tensions.‖180
Throughout the summer, multiple complaints were lodged against the Faction
members:










At a Picture Floor Plans demonstration, ―Faction members… refused to follow
instructions… For example, A. Bodin and C. Howlett returned again and again to
handing out leaflets in the midst of Aurora traffic after W. Hundley and B.
Valentine had repeatedly instructed them to cease this dangerous practice.‖
―During the Tradewell shop-in… A. Bodin and I. Bodin both disobeyed…
instructions against taking perishable and breakable items. This behavior was
repeated after the authorized project leader, W. Hundley, called the group
together and went over the instructions again.‖
―Last Saturday afternoon… new people joined the line [who] shared the
philosophy of this questionable group…With their addition the composition of the
line changed dramatically from an orderly peaceful line to a raucous, sauntering,
casual looking line… They in effect ‗took over‘ and the entire tone of the
demonstration was changed. Several people expressed their concern to me over
the underlying tone of violence in the chants and shouts.‖
Malicious and vulgar slogans, such as ‗let them see my backside‘ were
repeatedly sung or chanted during the picketing of Picture Floor Plans offices.
This practice continued after it was pointed out that such behavior is a violation of
the Rules for Action… engaging in this behavior were E. Fusco, M. Howard, I.
Bodin, J. Howlett, D. Paul, K. Cooper, and R. Sherman.
―They also share an attitude of provocation. They seem to hope something will
happen. They are excited by the sight of police cars or policemen and react in a
challenging or chip on the shoulder manner. It is a thrill-seeking attitude, as
though they hoped to become heroes or martyrs in the movement.‖181

179

Singler and others, 178-179.
Ibid, 179.
181
Ibid, 179.
180

73

This behavior was not the only issue with the Faction members. The group attempted
to undermine CORE leadership and recruit members to their side for an impending
takeover. In the invitation to the special Meeting to be held on Monday August 24,
1964, the Faction‘s claims were laid out for all members to see.182 They listed six
complains about the Seattle CORE Executive Committee:
1. The Executive Committee conceals from the membership information received
from the CORE national office.
2. The Executive Committee prevents the group from engaging in direct action.
3. The Executive Committee foisted a compromised agreement with Tradewell on
the membership.
4. The Executive Committee kept the resignation of the Negotiations chairman a
secret in order to avoid making a new appointment.
5. The CORE Leadership, especially the chairman and Vice-chairman are too
―responsible‖: as they have jobs, families and homes, and are thus afraid to
engage in direct action. CORE really needs – they say – negro leaders who
have NO jobs so that they can be truly militant.
6. The Executive Committee has secret meetings and exercises illegal power to
start or stop or frustrate direct action projects or proposals.183
The meeting would ―discuss in the open, divisive and derogatory allegations and
activities within the chapter by certain members.‖184
After the Seattle Real Estate Board levied charges against the Faction members,
Seattle CORE leadership limited itself to "one picket per business establishment against
Picture Floor Plans Real Estate Dealers as a temporary injunction."185 However,
national CORE did not punish the chapter for any wrongdoing; in fact the national
organization rarely punished local chapters for any infractions upon the Rules for Action.
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All Seattle CORE members were invited to the special meeting on August 24, to
hear both sides from the Faction and Executive Committee; and afterward the chapter
would need to decide on how to move forward. Six members, David Paul, Judy
Esparza, Aaron Bodin, Mona Howard, Charles Howlett, and Richard Cole, among
others were called into question by Seattle CORE leaders. The meeting was ―extremely
emotional‖ with each side confronting the other.186 Some members stepped forward to
confirm allegations made against the Faction. After hours of intense debate, the
meeting ended with five of the members of the faction leaving CORE to form their own
organization, and the remaining members agreeing to adhere to CORE principles.187
The dissension illustrates the importance of nonviolent training and the belief in
nonviolence by the members of the Seattle chapter. Only five of over two hundred
members decided to leave the organization. The vast majority backed the leadership,
the Executive Committee, and the nonviolent methods that Seattle CORE stood for.
Seattle CORE moved forward from this, strengthened and united. All members once
again shared a common goal of ridding the city of discrimination through nonviolence.
Seattle CORE is the only case of a chapter overcoming the desire for militancy in
the organization. Chapters in the North including Brooklyn, Baltimore, Harlem,
Cleveland, and Philadelphia all saw similar revolts that led to a more militant doctrine as
early as 1964. Internal strife caused the Detroit chapter to implode completely. In
addition, chapters across the country witnessed a dramatic drop in white membership
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and high racial disparities establishing an environment much more susceptible to Black
Nationalism. For example, by early 1965 the San Francisco chapter evolved into 80%
black membership with all leadership roles being held by black members. White
activists did not stop fighting for civil rights, but they moved onto other areas of activism
that were not related to racial discrimination. Frustration with local failures also added
to the turmoil of the organization. In national CORE similar wrangling over the
black/white issues and CORE's internal structure handcuffed the organization.188
Seattle CORE exhibited a unique ability to overcome these problems that overwhelmed
the rest of organization.

DEEDS

While the dissenting group did not take over, they did influence members of the
chapter. Even the Executive Committee openly admitted Seattle CORE wanted to do
more than the modest gains they made thus far. With the passing of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 in July, employment discrimination was banned in the United States. However,
very little had changed in hiring practices in Seattle. These factors propelled the
chapter to take on the largest project in Seattle CORE history, one that would make the
impact that they were seeking to make. That is when the Drive for Equal Employment
in Downtown Seattle (DEEDS) was born.
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First, Seattle CORE would investigate. Dr. Charles Valentine, a faculty member
in anthropology at the University of Washington, joined Seattle CORE in the early
1960s. Under his direction, a four phase study consisting of over thirty Seattle CORE
activists, generated a seventy-five page report on the employment discrimination in
downtown Seattle. The phases included a retail employment study, a survey of private
offices in eight major office buildings, a survey of all downtown government workers at
the federal, state, and county offices, and finally a customer survey of all retail stores
observing the ethnicity of each shopper.189 The report claimed that ―negroes hold
approximately 8,400 jobs in the Seattle Metropolitan Area, whereas if they were
employed in proportion to their numbers their share would be approximately 10,500 paid
positions.‖ The report goes on ―This racial deficit of more than 2,000 jobs also reflects
the fact that unemployment has steadily remained, over a good many years, twice as
high among Seattle Negroes as for the general population of the city.‖190 Blacks
accounted for less than 3.5% of jobs in downtown Seattle, and the vast majority were
menial labor positions.191
Seattle CORE set a lofty goal with DEEDS, the creation 1200 new jobs for
African Americans in downtown Seattle by early 1965 (or 300 jobs per month).192
Seattle CORE recruited from every organization with whom they had a previous
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connection with for this monumental task. The NAACP, Seattle urban League, Greater
Seattle Council of Churches, Catholic Interracial Council, Unitarians for Social Justice,
Baptist Ministers Alliance, and the Central Area Committee on civil rights all committed
to the DEEDS project.193
Valentine‘s research also showed that normal turnover opened about 5,350 jobs
per year.194 Seattle CORE‘s focus would be on these jobs. They did not need
companies to hire additional employees to meet their goal, they only needed to fill
cyclical openings with qualified African American workers. To match qualified workers
with the right openings, negotiators informed the companies about the Urban League
Job Line. The Seattle Chamber of Commerce pledged to hold a Jobs Fair in October,
assist in connecting companies with the Job Line, and open an Equal Opportunity
Centers that would serve as another method for qualified black workers to find job
opportunities. At the same time, Seattle CORE members prepared for direct action. By
September, they were holding neighborhood meetings to inform the black community
about DEEDS and they were already leafleting the black communities to spread the
word.195
In October, things began to fall apart. The Chamber of Commerce failed to come
through on their promises. First, the Jobs Fair was postponed indefinitely due to lack of
employer response.196 Secondly, the Equal Opportunity Centers that were opened, did
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not provide access to job openings, and CORE members saw them merely as
counseling centers. Seattle CORE along with some of the organizations contributing to
the DEEDS project held a downtown nonviolent direct action boycott on the day the fair
was supposed to be held – the NAACP and Urban League declined to participate.197
The boycott‘s purpose was to divert money from the downtown businesses to other
neighborhoods. In this regard, the boycott was successful as companies witnessed a
large decline in business according to the Federal Reserve Bank report.198
Nevertheless, DEEDS's only action was a boycott of the entire downtown area.
The Chamber of Commerce estimated that one hundred to two hundred new jobs had
been offered to African Americans during the DEEDS campaign, a figure that does not
take into account any blacks who may have been hired without the DEEDS campaign.
DEEDS fell short of the goal of 1,200 set by the organization in October. In the
February 1965 CORElator, Valentine argued that the community response ―produced
much evidence that employment remains the civil rights issue which interests Seattle
Negroes most.‖199 The organization would continue tackling employment discrimination
yet the failure of DEEDS raised many questions. Could Seattle CORE count on the
other civil rights organizations that were allies in the past? Could the chapter trust
organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce who all but reneged on their promises
to support the campaign? Could the Seattle chapter produce more results other than a
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handful of hires here and there? What type of effect would the events over the summer
followed by the failure with DEEDS have on the chapter?
This period of time was a turbulent era for Seattle CORE. It witnessed the
chapter reach over 200 members, one of the largest active rosters in all of CORE;
invent a revolutionary tactic – the Shop-in – that earned immediate results and put fear
into companies who did not change their discriminatory practices; and they finally won
battles against the A&P and Tradewell grocery chains who had been breaching their
agreements with Seattle CORE for over two years. However, the Seattle community
rejected their first and only foray into housing discrimination rejected by the Seattle
community and the chapter also experienced dissension when small portion of their
membership refused to follow the Rules for Action and attempted a hostile takeover of
the Executive Committee and chapter leadership; and they ended the year with the
failed DEEDS project – their largest effort to change employment discrimination in the
city. National CORE as well as other local affiliates also faced similar issues. However,
what broke the rest of the organization, only strengthened Seattle CORE. Even though
their pet project failed, Seattle CORE showed its commitment to nonviolence and
changing the city as they continued forward to target taxi cab companies, and trade
unions in the chapter's final years.
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CHAPTER IV: TAXI CABS, SCHOOLS AND THE DEATH OF CORE

Unlike many of the other local chapters in the Congress of Racial Equality, the
failure of a pet project did not destroy the Seattle affiliate. Instead, Seattle CORE
continued to move forward after DEEDS to focus on the discriminatory hiring practices
of local taxi cab companies and trade unions. In addition, the chapter also ventured into
education discrimination which resulted from a de facto segregation due to the housing
situation within the city. After the Seattle Public School Board rejected proposals to
realign the school zones, Seattle CORE devised a highly popular yet highly
controversial boycott that would remove children from public schools and came under
fire for promoting truancy.
As Seattle CORE moved forward, the national organization collapsed. Chapter 4
examines the final years of Seattle CORE and the effect the Black Power Movement
had on the civil rights movement and in National CORE. It becomes apparent that
Seattle CORE's strengths that led to progress against Seattle area discrimination and
their ability to push forward and overcome the desire for militancy that plagued Northern
chapters of CORE were also the main causes for the disintegration of the national
CORE as a leading civil rights organization. Poor leadership, disorganization, and
fragmentation led to inactivity, massive debt, and a fatal decision that destroyed the
Congress of Racial Equality.
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Taxi Cab Companies

A 1964 study by the Washington State Board against Discrimination on the Taxi
Cab Companies in Seattle found that racial discrimination was rampant in the
transportation business. The Yellow Cab Company, the Farwest Cab Company, and
the Graytop Cab Company were all investigated. The Yellow Cab Company employed
35 black drivers of their 300 total or 11.7%.200 The Farwest Cab Company employed
zero black drivers with 250 employed drivers, and the Graytop Cab Company employed
zero black drivers with 130 drivers.201 The president of Farwest Cab Company, Fred
Hosking, argued that white passengers would refuse to get in a cab behind a black
driver.202 Once again Seattle CORE decided to take direct action against Farwest and
Graytop Cab Companies, however, the chapter would need to find a creative way to
target a business that was mobile.
Seattle CORE rounded up their usual allies; local black churches and fellow civil
rights groups in the area, to launch "Operation Pogo Stick." They planned to use roving
picket lines at popular taxi cab locations such as airports, restaurants, hospitals, and
hotels. Furthermore, the chapter created bumper stickers that read "Don't Ride
Farwest-Graytop Cabs / They Discriminate!" that supporters attached to their
vehicles.203 The idea was to hurt the companies' business by increasing public
awareness of the discriminatory hiring practices. With a third alternative, The Yellow
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Cab Company that did hire black drivers, Seattle CORE's expected a dip in business
that would force Graytop and Farwest to change their discriminatory policies. In
addition, Seattle CORE learned that the Farwest Cab Company had signed a
nondiscrimination clause in an exclusive contract with the Seattle School Board which
required that Farwest "not discriminate against any employee or applicant because of
race, creed, or national origin."204
With the pressure mounting on the cab companies, they relented just five months
after Seattle CORE initiated Operation Pogo Stick. In February of 1965 Graytop hired
its first African American driver, and in March, Farwest employed their first two black
drivers.205 It was another modest victory for Seattle CORE, yet a welcomed one after
the shortcomings of DEEDS and the turbulent previous year. The Seattle chapter saw
one more area of employment discrimination that they needed to target; over the next
two years, Seattle CORE shifted its attention to education segregation.

Education Discrimination

Motivated by the news of Bloody Sunday in Alabama (March 7, 1965) and the
other ongoing violence in Mississippi, Seattle CORE turn its full attention on education.
Despite the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954 and the Civil Rights Act of
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1964, Seattle's Central Area schools were nearly all black due to the de facto housing
segregation. By the spring of 1965 CORE and the NAACP were in negotiations with the
school board to end the segregation in schools. The School Board rejected the Triad
Plan as well as a plan created by the NAACP to realign the school zones to integrate
Seattle Schools. Superintendant Ernest Campbell told the Urban League, "The public
schools do not exist for the purpose of imposing broad social reforms upon the
people."206 In lieu of the school board's unwillingness to integrate, Seattle CORE
decided it was time for a drastic measure that was the "most controversial" moment in
Seattle's fight for equality.207
The chapter decided upon a two-day boycott of Seattle public schools during
which they provided a substitute educational program for children from kindergarten to
high school seniors" called the "Freedom Schools."208 The goal of the Freedom
Schools was to provide an alternative to public schools in an integrated setting. There
would be one white and one black co-principal at each school, as well as white and
black students and teachers.
To make this work CORE would need a mountain of assistance from their allies.
Local black and white churches in the Central Area including Mount Zion Baptist,
Tabernacle Baptist, First AME, Madrona Presbyterian, Goodwill Baptist, and Cherry Hill
Baptist all volunteered space for the classes. Furthermore, the East Madison YMCA,

206

Seattle School Board minutes, May 12, 1965, Seattle Public School Archives, Record 61, pp. 302-5.
Interview by Trevor Griffey and Janet Jones with John Hurst Adams, June 24th, 2005,
http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/adams.htm <last accessed February 1, 2012>.
208
Singler and others, 157.
207

84

East Cherry YWCA, Prince Hall Masonic Temple, Woodland Park Presbyterian Church,
St. Peter Claver Center, and the Atlantic Street Center also committed to aid Seattle
CORE's school boycott.209 Finally, the chapter needed teachers to support their
supplementary schools; over one hundred volunteers would aid Seattle CORE's
boycott. Seattle CORE set up a mandatory training session for the volunteer teachers
and co-principals to provide a quality learning experience and plan the curriculum for
each class.210
To fill the classes CORE initiated leaflet and mailing campaigns in the Central
Area. Local television and newspaper coverage also aided in spreading public
awareness; however, it was not all positive. Starting on March, 15, 1966 the Seattle
Times published interviews debating the validity and legality of the school boycott.
Published opinions from local church leaders, ACLU lawyers, parents, teachers, and
CORE members argued for and against the boycott. For instance, the Very Reverend
John C. Leffler, of St. Mark's Episcopal Cathedral, supported school integration;
however, he argued against truancy as a form of protest. Other white clergymen also
argued against the boycott claiming it "implanted the idea of lawlessness in children's
minds."211 Yet the amount of publicity raised public awareness of segregation in Seattle
schools to an all time high. As Herb Robinson stated on March 20, "even if only a
handful of children are absent from class those two days, the boycott sponsors have
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accomplished their purpose by stirring up the most vigorous public debate in Seattle to
date on racial imbalance in the schools."212
The publicity leading up to the boycott created a huge response from the Seattle
area community. Seattle CORE was prepared for 75-100 students per site, however,
the Freedom Schools witnessed 150 students per site and the First AME Church tried to
accommodate 175 children. Some Central Area public schools saw a 50% absentee
rate on the two-day boycott.213 Although the Freedom Schools had a budget of only
$800 for nearly 4000 students the project was highly successful.214 There was not an
immediate response to the activism but it raised public awareness on segregation
Seattle CORE, initiated the first step in changing the city's public schools. Over the next
decade, Seattle public schools enhanced curriculum in regards to African American
culture and history, paid for the transportation costs in a voluntary transfer program that
helped integrate schools, added sensitivity training for teachers and staff, and hired
more African Americans.215
The Seattle CORE public schools boycott was a part of the fight against
segregation ongoing throughout the country. In June 1966, James Meredith was shot
and injured in Mississippi near the beginning of his "March against Fear," Three months
after the boycott the federal government also took action to stop segregation in schools.
The Department of Education funded a Desegregation Training Institute run by the
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political science department at the University of Oregon. The institute provided a six
week training program created to break down and deal with the inherent problems of de
facto segregation in public schools.
Until this point, Seattle CORE avoided the problems and dysfunction of other
chapters and the national organization. Leadership changes, mounting debt and
fragmentation and infighting overwhelmed the CORE yet Seattle found ways to avoid
these problems and remain effective. However, the national organization transformed
radically in an attempt to stay relevant with the rise of black power in the civil rights
movement; and these changes altered the fate of Seattle CORE.

Black Power and the Death of CORE

Within CORE, Black Power divided the organization at every level. It became
clear that Black Power's popularity was on the rise shortly after Stokely Carmichael
coined the term on June 16, 1966 when he commented "this is the 27th time I have
been arrested and I ain't going to jail no more! The only way we gonna stop them White
men from whuppin' us is to take over. What we gonna start sayin' now is Black
Power!"216 Carmichael echoed the sentiments of many African American activists who
witnessed atrocities in the South. In Mississippi in 1964, four civil rights activists were
murdered with another four critically wounded, eighty Freedom summer workers were
violently assaulted, thirty-seven churches were bombed, and another thirty black homes
216
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were burned to the ground. Racial unrest spread across the country as thousands
rioted in Los Angeles in 1965, and in Detroit in 1967.217 Tired and frustrated with the
pace of nonviolence and the civil rights movement and appalled by the violence in the
South, the ideals behind Black Power were a welcomed change in the minds of many
blacks, especially in the North. The advancements of the South, had little impact on the
everyday lives of Northern blacks and that created a divide in the civil rights movement
in the North and South.
The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, with Carmichael as a
spokesman, was the first nonviolent organization to change its philosophy. The Black
Power movement further fragmented the civil rights movement as it divided activists into
two groups; one side following Martin Luther King Jr. and his nonviolent methods, and
the other following Carmichael and the newly minted Black Power movement. CORE
was caught in the middle. CORE, much like SNCC, was founded upon nonviolent
principles, however many Northern chapters were already pushing militant agendas.
Brooklyn, Detroit, Cleveland, Baltimore, Harlem, San Francisco, and Philadelphia
experienced upheavals in leadership that resulted in a more militant ideology in these
chapters. Some CORE leaders, such as Floyd McKissick, believed Black Power was
the next step in the evolution of the civil rights movement but accused the media of
distorting Black Power to include separatism and militancy. Facing declining
membership and overwhelming debt, McKissick declared "1966 shall be remembered
as the year we left our imposed status of Negroes and became Black Men...." McKissick
217
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continued, "1966 is the year of the concept of Black Power. The year when black men
realized their full worth in society -- their dignity and their beauty -- and their power -- the
greatest power on the earth -- the power of right, in hopes of revitalizing the
organization.218 In reality, this had the opposite effect; CORE lost more funding,
inactivity rose sharply, and many white supporters turned away from the organization.
By the 1967 national convention, CORE was divided. There were two factions,
one led by McKissick with the support of Midwest and Southern chapters; and another
led by Sol Herbert, the Bronx CORE chairman, who had the support of the Northeast
chapters. Herbert and the Northeastern chapters demanded the ouster of the remaining
whites and a shift to an entirely separatist militant organization.219 By the spring of
1968, McKissick decided to leave CORE, and one of his supporters, the newly elected
associate national director, Roy Innis, assumed leadership of the organization and
finished what McKissick started. The March edition of the CORElator declared "CORE
All Black."220
As seen in CORE, the desire for militancy was a northern phenomenon. There
were two reasons northern African Americans looked to a more militant stance in their
fight for equality. First, Northern blacks did not see change in their everyday lives that
Southern blacks witnessed as the walls of Jim Crow broke down; and second, Northern
blacks were fed up with the lack of results and the slow pace of nonviolence and the
civil rights movement as a whole. In the South, there was tangible progress being made
218
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as the civil rights movement progressed. For instance, the Voting Rights Act of 1964
and Civil Rights Act of 1965 witnessed change across the South. The change was real,
and it affected every Southern black on a daily basis. However, in the North, racial
discrimination was less obvious. As seen in Seattle, housing discrimination created de
facto segregation. Companies hired some blacks, but only to menial labor jobs, and in
disproportion to the population percentage of blacks. As the civil rights movement
progressed, these types of discrimination were barely addressed and it was far more
difficult for Northern blacks to feel any change was happening. A desire for a new
strategy grew as the more subtle forms of discrimination in the North still thrived.
Seattle was not immune to these feelings as a Black Panther group formed in the
city and Seattle CORE faced a rebellion by a group of its own members desiring
militancy; however, Seattle CORE's leadership and foundation of the chapter overcame
the revolt. Sticking to the strict recruitment and training guidelines and processes laid
out by national CORE, Seattle CORE built a membership who believed in nonviolence.
However, the survival of the Seattle CORE only highlighted the downfall of the national
organization. Each chapter governed itself, allowing for separate rules, regulations, and
ideology from one chapter to the next. This fragmented the entire organization with
some chapters leaning towards militancy, and others continuing with nonviolent
methods. The Black Power Movement was a catalyst for fragmentation. Founding
members in the National Action Committee could not agree on the use of Black Power
with the national office employees, chapters in the Northeast desired separatism and
militancy while chapters in the South and Midwest desired nonviolence and integration,
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and black members were pushing out white members at regional meetings. Despite
this, Seattle CORE remained vigilant. The chapter continued fighting against
discrimination in education, taking on trade unions in 1967 into 1968 until CORE
became a separatist militant organization in the spring of 1968.
The white members of the chapter did not fight the national organizations
decision to expel all of the white members throughout the national organization;
however, it was met with some confusion, some animosity, and finally acceptance within
the ranks of Seattle CORE. In an interview for the University of Washington's Seattle
civil rights project, Jean Adams remembered voting for an African American for a
leadership position solely because they were black; "it should be black people who were
making these decisions, it was better for white people to not be involved in this and
black people were saying 'you should not be involved.'" She goes on to say "originally, I
believed they meant [whites] not be involved as a spokesman," but still be able to assist
in the fight against discrimination.221 "Some did not see the necessity of this change in
policy and left feeling hurt. Some were sad that the organization they had devoted so
much time and energy to was no longer the same CORE. Some resented being
excluded racially."222 A meeting later that month, on March 28, was set up to explain
the decision to the white members but no one showed up.223
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Seattle CORE tried to reform as a black militant group, electing new leadership
and attempting to unite the black members to revive the dying chapter; however,
mounting debt, inexperience, and lack of membership was too much to overcome. The
last CORElator was published in April 1968, and the Seattle chapter of CORE ceased to
exist shortly after.
Seattle CORE had marched on despite many setbacks. The DEEDS failure, lack
of results fighting discrimination in housing and education, and minimal gains in
employment discrimination did not deter the chapter. In 1965, the chapter targeted
education discrimination for the first time while they continued their assault on
employment discrimination focusing on taxi cab companies and trade unions. Seattle
CORE continued as the rest of the organization crumbled; however, the poor decisions
made by national CORE piled up. The National Action Committee and the national
office struggled over the direction of CORE. The fragmentation between the two
governing bodies crippled the organization and created more division between local
chapters and national CORE. Some of the local chapters and the National Action
Committee led by Floyd McKissick assaulted Farmer's leadership, and the local
chapters that did not shift to a militant doctrine, struggled with inactivity and obscurity
that plagued the organization in the early 1950s. Militancy did not overtake the Seattle
chapter. A declaration by newly elected CORE chairman McKissick announced CORE
as an organization under Black Power did not impact Seattle CORE. It was not until the
national organization made the fatal mistake of expelling all white members from the
organization, that the Seattle chapter was affected. Despite outrage from both the white
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and black members in the chapter, Seattle CORE begrudgingly accepted the national
organization's decision. The chapter tried to reinvent the chapter under the new black
nationalist ideology, but could rally enough support; not only did the chapter lose half its
membership of white members, but many of the African Americans also left as they too
were unhappy with being forced to disband their successful association; membership
inactivity skyrocketed, funding plummeted and many of the founding members who
were the cornerstone for Seattle CORE were forced to move on to new projects.
Returning to the historical debate on why CORE shifted to militancy, one can see
where each of the three hypotheses previously covered in the introduction had merit but
also where each comes up short. Meier and Rudwick were accurate in arguing the
ideological shift from nonviolence to militancy was an attempt to save a dying
organization; Danielson was also correct inspecting the inherent weaknesses of
nonviolence. The pace of nonviolence played a significant role in agitating black
activists who turned to militancy to achieve the results they desired. Frazier identified
the turmoil between leadership that also played a major part, but he focused on the
wrong aspect of leadership. The real issue in leadership was the ineffectiveness of the
founders, and the mistake of changing leaders from Farmer to Robinson in 1961, not an
inevitable transformation to militancy due to a hidden agenda among the founding
members. On top of these areas of weakness, CORE struggled due to the foundation
of the organization. CORE set itself up to fail from the beginning. The failure of the
founding members to establish the groundwork for long sustained success crippled the

93

organization throughout its history. As time went on, these problems magnified until
they drowned the organization.
First, national CORE failed to setup a working foundation for the organization in
the 1940s. The founding members never achieved the support from the local chapters
it needed to succeed. Local chapters repeatedly shot down the idea of sharing their
funds with the national organization. National CORE's inability to gain financial aid from
local chapters crippled the organization's ability to develop. Staffing a national office,
creating unemployment offices, hiring civil rights lawyers on retainer to assist against
discrimination for free, establishing nonviolent training programs in each region for the
local chapters were all plans national CORE were forced to shelve for decades. It was
not until the Freedom Rides in the 1960s that national CORE finally had the funding to
expand. During the Freedom Rides, CORE received record donations that the
organization used to establish its national office and hire lawyers to defend the Freedom
Riders. However, CORE failed to understand the limitations of funding based on
singular events and when the funding declined, CORE was trapped under an avalanche
of debt. The debt limited national CORE's effectiveness as the organization could no
longer afford large scale demonstrations, staffing for a national office, lawyer fees, and
programs to aid the community.
National CORE had little to no control over local chapters. This was evident in
the inability to force local chapters to support national CORE financially, but also in
controlling the doctrines of each individual chapter. Despite establishing very strict rules
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and regulations for each chapter to follow, national CORE never enforced these.
Northern chapters especially exploited the relaxed system of government, pushed a
militant agenda as early as the late 1940s and continued to spread a black nationalist
agenda until it overwhelmed the organization in 1966. Even more damning, the national
organization did not follow their own sets of rules. National CORE never investigated
discrimination before taking direct action; instead, the organization focused on
challenging legislature to stir up controversy. National CORE's focus was always
gaining publicity which only furthered the "white organization" stereotype as it focused
very little on issues affecting black communities.
The early leadership of George Houser demonstrated the ineffectiveness of
national CORE to establish any control over the chapters. Repeatedly, Houser futilely
attempted to establish a foundation of government for the organization that was
rebuffed by the local affiliates. It was not until James Robinson assumed command in
the late 1950s that CORE prospered. The late 1950s witnessed an increase in funding
and relevance, while the organization expanded. As James Farmer ascended to the
leadership role in the 1960s, CORE witnessed the organization's peak. CORE reaching
its highest number of chapters, active members, and funding. As the civil rights
movement witnessed a slowing of popularity, CORE suffered. With the rising debt of
the organization Farmer came under scrutiny and stepped down in 1966. Floyd
McKissick was elected as his replacement and quickly changed the identity of the
organization from nonviolence to militancy as an attempt to revitalize the dying
organization. McKissick's inability to turn CORE around encouraged his exit from
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organization in 1967. Marvin Rich assumed control and has led what is left of CORE
ever since. While it is easy to point to the loss of Farmer as national director as the
reason CORE shifted to a militant agenda, a more important factor is the switch to
Farmer from Robinson. Under Robinson's leadership in the late 1950's, CORE pulled
itself away from ineffectiveness and inactivity while setting itself up for sustained
success. The bureaucratic style of Robinson created a funding surplus, kept local
affiliates in check, and established a foundation for the national organization to grow;
Farmer, on the other hand, was charismatic and brilliant orator, yet even he admitted he
lacked bureaucratic skills - which CORE desperately needed as their popularity
exploded during the early 1960s.
A second problem, was a dual leadership system that hampered the
organization's direction. CORE had a governing council called the National Action
Committee that was formed by founding members. The job of the council was to
oversee the health of the organization. There was also a national office, led by the
executive secretary until 1960 when the position of national director was created by the
National Action Committee. The director ran all the day to day operations of the entire
organization and the chairman's power was only usurped by the Committee. This dual
power system created two notable divides in the organization. First when the National
Action Committee supplanted James Robinson with James Farmer in 1961 and then
again when the committee drove Farmer out of the national director position in favor of
Floyd McKissick in 1966. Prior to the creation of the position of national chairman, the
executive secretary was elected democratically at the National Convention. The
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National Action Committee's creation of a new position removed that power from local
chapters, and in both occurrences the local chapters had no say in the final decision.
This only strained the relationship between the national organization and the local
affiliates further.
What destroyed the Congress of Racial Equality was not what happened in the
mid 1960s but the events leading up to that period. CORE was unprepared to handle
funding and the pressure Black Power put on the organization. The weaknesses of
national CORE created upon its founding made the organization vulnerable. National
CORE's weaknesses were Seattle CORE's strengths: an integrated organization,
bureaucratic leadership, a plan of action based on nonviolent actions, and strong
attachment to the black community.
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CONCLUSION

Tracing Seattle CORE's history in comparison to national CORE highlights the
failures of the Congress of Racial Equality and why one of the leading civil rights
organizations of the 1960s drastically changed its philosophy from nonviolent
integrationist to black nationalism; and in turn destroyed the organization. The
weaknesses of the national organization were areas of strengths for the local affiliate;
the foundation and organization of the chapter, leadership, the relationship with the
black community, and the ability to raise adequate funding were the central reasons
Seattle CORE rose to one of the strongest chapters within the organization.
The foundation of the chapter was a vital reason Seattle CORE fended off black
militancy while other Northern chapters and national CORE succumbed. Leadership
from members during the chapter's infancy, such as Ray Williams, Don Matson, Reggie
Alleyne, and Walt Hundley, organized the chapter for sustained success. Leadership
contrasted greatly from the National organization; well organized, strong planning, and
experienced the leaders of Seattle CORE pushed the chapter to find success.
Furthermore, Seattle CORE required training in nonviolent methods, use of African
Americans in leadership roles, and following a strict set of guidelines that rewarded
great dividends. Training every new member of Seattle CORE in the way of
nonviolence prepared the chapter for activism as well as instilling the morals and values
the organization desired in its members. In addition, Seattle CORE also made excellent
use of the little funding they received. They used their funds on direct action campaigns
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that helped the local black community and never over extended. Whenever they could
afford to do so, they donated extra funds to national CORE.
Seattle CORE built a relationship with the black community through churches
and making tangible progress that everyday blacks could see. Even though the steps
forward were minimal, it was enough to legitimize the organization within the black
community. Furthermore, the use of African Americans in positions of leadership also
broke down the "white organization" stereotype. Having the support of local blacks was
paramount to the success of Seattle CORE and fending off black militancy that arose in
the city as unrest swept across the nation. The training and interracial relationships
built among members also assisted in fighting off black nationalism in the chapter.
Their results never reached the expectations of the chapter, but the members
refused to yield to the internal and external pressures that national CORE succumbed
to. Internally, Seattle CORE members relied on their training, values, and relationships
to deal with their shortcomings and to unite against a small group named the Faction to
end a revolt for militancy. Externally, the Seattle affiliate overcame the dysfunction that
plagued the rest of the organization, until national CORE's decision to expel their white
membership; the decision meant to save the organization instead destroyed it.
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APPENDIX A: MAP OF NEGRO POPULATION IN 1960 CENTRAL
AREA SEATTLE
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Figure 1 - 1960 Map of the Negro Population in Seattle, Seattle Civil Rights and Labor History Project, University
of Washington, Seattle, Washington.
http://depts.washington.edu/civilr/display.cgi?image=segregated/schmidt-black-1960.jpg <last accessed
3/30/2012>.
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